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ABSTRACT 
 
KEVIN S. MARKLE: Shift Happens: A Comparison of the Tax-Motivated Income Shifting 
of Multinationals in Territorial and Worldwide Countries 
(Under the direction of Douglas A. Shackelford) 
 
 
 This paper tests for differences in the tax-motivated income shifting behaviors of 
multinationals subject to different systems of taxing foreign earnings. I find that 
multinationals subject to territorial tax regimes shift more income than those subject to 
worldwide tax regimes, but that the difference in shifting is not statistically different when 
the worldwide firms can defer repatriation of the shifted income. I also find that the 
difference in shifting is greater when the multinational is cash-constrained in its home 
country. In additional tests, I find that worldwide firms bear the dead-weight cost of having 
cash trapped in foreign subsidiaries while territorial firms do not. 
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1. Introduction  
It is well documented that firms shift income across jurisdictions when they have a 
tax incentive and the ability to do so.1  What is not yet known is whether the home country of 
a multinational affects its propensity to shift income.  Because countries tax the foreign 
earnings of their multinationals differently, the domicile of a multinational might affect its 
income shifting if the tax laws reduce the incentive to shift.  This paper tests for differences 
in income shifting based on cross-country variation in the taxation of foreign subsidiaries.2 
Most studies of the effects of home country taxation of foreign earnings divide 
countries into two categories:  territorial and worldwide.  Territorial countries are those that 
generally exempt foreign income from home country tax.  Worldwide countries are those that 
tax foreign income at the home country rate and allow credits for the foreign tax paid on the 
income.3  However, many countries do not treat all types of foreign income uniformly and 
commonly have different rules for personal and corporate income and/or active and passive 
income.  For example, Sweden exempts the foreign income of its corporations but fully taxes 
the foreign income of its individuals, meaning that Sweden would be classified as a territorial 
                                                            
1 See Devereux and Maffini (2007) for a survey of this literature.  More recent studies on the topic include Dischinger 
(2009), Dischinger and Riedel (2008), Klassen and Laplante (2009), and Dyreng and Lindsey (2009). 
2 There is no universally accepted definition of tax-motivated income shifting in the literature. In this study, I consider 
shifted income to be taxable income reported in a jurisdiction different from that in which it would be reported absent an 
action taken by management where a motive for the action taken is to reduce the overall tax burden of the multinational.  
Income can be shifted in many ways.  The most common are through manipulation of the prices of intra-firm trades (transfer 
prices), location of debt, and location of intangibles.  In this study, I do not address how the shifting is accomplished, but 
rather infer that income has been shifted based on deviation from an expected level of reported income. 
3 The systems are sometimes referred to as exemption and credit systems, respectively.   
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country for corporate tax purposes but as a worldwide country for individual tax purposes.  In 
this study, I consider only multinational corporations and, as such, classify countries based 
on how they treat the foreign income of their corporations.4 
Prior studies have shown that multinationals domiciled in territorial countries behave 
differently from those domiciled in worldwide countries in location of foreign direct 
investment (Hines, 1996, Clausing, 2009, Smart, 2010), headquarter relocations (Voget, 
2008), and in subsidiary location choices (Barrios et al, 2009).5  However, to my knowledge, 
no one has tested whether companies from territorial and worldwide countries differ in their 
response to tax incentives and opportunities to shift income.  This paper conducts such tests. 
 Understanding whether income shifting is more prevalent in territorial countries 
should be important to policymakers because the international landscape is changing; both 
Japan and the UK (representing 9% and 5%, respectively, of global GDP) adopted territorial 
corporate tax systems in 2009, leaving the U.S. (28% of global GDP) as the sole member of 
the G8 taxing the worldwide active business income of its corporations.6  Both the UK and 
Japan cited the competitiveness of their multinationals in global markets as a first-order 
                                                            
4 Even within the realm of corporate tax, the worldwide/territorial classification is not as straightforward as it is commonly 
presented to be. It is most accurately made at the country-pair level since several countries treat the income earned in 
different countries differently.  For example, Canada exempts the income earned in countries with which Canada has a 
bilateral treaty and taxes income earned in all non-treaty countries.  Canada is most commonly classified as a territorial 
country since most of its trade is with treaty countries, but income earned by Canadian multinationals in approximately 35% 
of the countries of the world is subject to Canadian tax.  Of the 32 (19) territorial (worldwide) parent countries in my 
sample, 15 (7) tax (exempt) foreign income earned in at least one foreign country. For ease of exposition, I continue to 
classify parent countries based on their predominant system in the text, but classifications are made at the country-pair level 
for the empirical tests in the paper. 
5 It should be noted that several other studies (Slemrod, 1990, Benassy-Quere et al, 2000, Altshuler and Grubert, 2001, and 
Hajkova et al, 2006) find no difference in the sensitivities to tax of the investments of the two groups.  
6 Because my study uses 2006 data, Japan and the UK are worldwide countries in this paper. 
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impetus for the change in policy.7  It is widely acknowledged that the compliance costs of a 
worldwide system are significantly higher than those of a territorial system due to, for 
example, requirements of tracking foreign tax credits. It is concerns about such dead-weight 
costs and their impact on competitiveness that drive U.S. multinationals to call for 
conformity with other countries as the debates over international tax reform continue 
(Samuels, 2009).  Missing from those debates are empirical comparisons of the behaviors of 
multinationals subject to different international tax laws.  This paper begins to fill that void. 
 The incentive for a multinational to shift income is assumed to be driven by the 
expected returns to the shifting.  Consider two multinational firms, T and W, identical except 
that T is domiciled in a territorial country, W in a worldwide country.  Each has a home 
country tax rate of ߬௉ and owns one foreign subsidiary with a 0% tax rate.  Both T and W 
shift $S of pretax income to their respective subsidiary, the subsidiary pays no tax and returns 
a $S dividend to its parent.  T’s dividend is exempt from home country tax, so T realizes 
savings from the shifting of $ܵ כ ߬௉.  W includes $S in its taxable income, has home country 
tax payable of $ܵ כ ߬௉, which is equivalent to the tax W would have paid if the income was 
not shifted, and W realizes no return on income shifting. 
 On the surface, it appears obvious that territorial firms have a greater incentive to 
shift income.  However, this highly stylized example does not include the effects of two 
important aspects of the worldwide system, deferral and cross-crediting, which can blur the 
distinctions from the territorial system (Altshuler, 2000, de Mooij and Ederveen, 2003).  
                                                            
7 In a February, 2010 presentation, David Hartnett, Permanent Secretary for Tax, HM Revenue and Customs, said that three 
primary factors in the decision for the UK to switch to a territorial system were competitiveness, compliance burden, and 
anti-avoidance measures (Taxes, 2010). 
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Deferral refers to the provision which delays the liability for home country tax on the foreign 
earnings until they are repatriated as a dividend and adds a discount factor to the home 
country tax paid on the foreign earnings.  Cross-crediting allows W to reduce its tax payable 
on foreign earnings if its foreign subsidiary in a second foreign country has paid tax at a rate 
higher than W’s.  Extending the example, if W had a second subsidiary with tax rate 
߬ு(where ߬ு ൐ ߬௉) that earned $I in pretax income, that subsidiary would pay $ܫ כ ߬ு of tax, 
which is $ܫ כ ሺ߬ு െ ߬௉ሻ more than would have been paid at W’s tax rate.  Cross-crediting 
allows W to reduce its $ܵ כ ߬௉ liability on the income shifted to the zero-tax subsidiary by 
$ܫ כ ሺ߬ு െ ߬௉ሻ, the amount of the excess credit for the tax paid in the high-tax country.  If the 
excess credit is greater than or equal to $ܵ כ ߬௉, W saves $ܵ כ ߬௉ (the same amount as the 
territorial parent, T) by shifting. 
 While the complexity of international tax law makes its consequences difficult to 
capture in generalized examples, the above example shows that the returns to (and, therefore, 
incentives for) income shifting for a multinational may be affected by how its foreign 
earnings are taxed and by the organizational structure and timing decisions of the firm itself.  
Of course, incentive is just one factor in determining whether firms shift income.  Other 
factors include the constraints on the ability to shift (e.g., laws) and the costs (e.g., agency, 
political, efficiency) of shifting.  As such, the observed income shifting of a multinational is 
determined by the interplay of its incentives, opportunities and constraints. Whether there are 
systematic differences in income shifting across groups of multinationals subject to different 
international tax laws is the empirical question asked in this paper. 
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Using a framework developed by Hines and Rice (1994), a tax variable which 
captures the incentive and opportunity to shift income among all countries in which the 
multinational operates, financial statement data of subsidiaries in 31 countries owned by 
parents in 51 countries, and pair-specific information about the bilateral tax relationship 
between countries, I directly compare the income shifting of worldwide and territorial 
multinationals to determine if there are systematic differences in how each responds to the 
incentive and opportunity to reduce overall tax burden by shifting income across borders. 
Four main findings emerge from the study.  First, multinationals in both groups engage in 
tax-motivated income shifting and territorial firms, on average, shift more income than 
worldwide firms.  Second, the income shifting of worldwide firms is increasing in their 
ability to invest the funds abroad while that of territorial firms is not.  Stated another way, 
worldwide firms that can leave the shifted funds abroad shift as much as their territorial 
counterparts.  Third, territorial firms shift more income when the parent is cash-constrained 
while worldwide firms shift less.  Finally, despite the evidence that territorial firms shift 
more income to their low-tax subsidiaries, it is worldwide firms that bear the dead-weight 
cost of having more cash trapped in their low-tax subsidiaries.  Japan adds some wrinkles to 
the results.  In by-parent-country tests, I find no evidence of income shifting by Japanese 
multinationals and am unable, despite running multiple additional tests, to identify what is 
constraining Japanese firms that is not constraining firms domiciled in other countries.  When 
Japan is excluded from the sample, inferences from all tests remain the same, but the 
magnitudes of the differences between the groups change.   
The primary contribution of my paper is that it provides direct evidence of an 
association between income shifting and the taxation of foreign income in the parent’s 
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country.  To my knowledge, this is the first study to identify and test a specific determinant 
of income shifting behavior; while prior studies have shown that income is shifted in 
different settings and by different means, no study has documented specific factors that affect 
the degree of shifting.  My findings contribute needed empirical data to the ongoing debate 
about international tax policy, the relevance of which is underscored by the recent changes 
made by Japan and the UK and the increasing isolation of the U.S. in the international tax 
realm.   
My paper also contributes to the stream of literature examining the dead-weight costs 
associated with international tax rules.  Extant research has shown that U.S. multinationals 
bear such costs and assumed that they impair the competitiveness of U.S. firms in markets 
where they compete with multinationals subject to territorial tax regimes.  My results provide 
direct evidence of one such competitive disadvantage, the trapping of cash in foreign 
subsidiaries. 
Finally, my paper contributes more generally to a growing literature in international 
tax and financial accounting by including countries from many different regions in the same 
sample.  Much of the existing literature that is grouped under the banner “international” uses 
samples consisting either of parents domiciled in one country only (predominantly the U.S.) 
and their foreign affiliates or of European parents and their European subsidiaries.  My study 
is among the first to use more comprehensive data that allow some of the caveats on 
generalizability of results to begin to be relaxed. 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the principles of the tax systems 
and the relevant prior literature, and develops hypotheses.  Section 3 describes the research 
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design.  Section 4 describes the data. Section 5 presents the empirical findings. Concluding 
remarks follow. 
  
 
 
 
2. Background and Hypotheses 
2.1  Systems of taxing earnings of foreign subsidiaries 
 The reason that foreign earnings are taxed differently from domestic earnings is that 
all countries adhere to two general principles.  First, that the country in which the income is 
earned has the right to tax it.  Second, that each dollar of income should be taxed only once.  
The territorial system avoids double-taxation by exempting foreign income from domestic 
tax.  The worldwide system avoids double-taxation by granting credits for foreign taxes paid 
which reduce the domestic tax liability.  Every country in the world has autonomy in 
choosing whether and how to tax foreign earnings and whether and how to mitigate double-
taxation. Despite this sovereignty over tax laws, in choosing how to tax the foreign earnings 
of their multinationals, the vast majority of countries choose one of two systems: territorial 
and worldwide.8 Because this is so, an empirical investigation of the how the taxation of 
foreign income affects behavior is appropriately made by sorting observations into two 
groups. In order to understand how the differences between the groups may affect income 
shifting behavior, it is necessary to understand the principles and mechanics of each system. 
A territorial parent receives dividends paid out of the after-tax earnings of its foreign 
subsidiaries and pays no domestic tax on those earnings.9  The worldwide system is more 
                                                            
8 To my knowledge, prior research has not explored the reasons that countries have clustered on this dimension while 
maintaining differences along other dimensions. 
9 There is a subdivision within the territorial group, with some countries taxing 5% of foreign dividends upon repatriation 
and some fully exempting all foreign dividends. The countries that choose to tax 5% of the dividends (Belgium, France, 
Germany, Italy, Netherlands Antilles, and Switzerland) do so as a means to offset any expenses related to the foreign 
subsidiaries that are incurred and deducted from taxable income in the parent country.  Most countries that fully exempt the 
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complicated because it does not treat the income of each foreign subsidiary in isolation. The 
underlying premise of the worldwide system is that the parent should pay the same amount of 
tax (the sum of foreign and domestic) that would be paid if the income were earned 
domestically, regardless of where the income is earned.  Consider the case of a parent 
owning two foreign subsidiaries, H and L, where H’s tax rate is higher than the parent’s and 
L’s is lower than the parent’s. When H pays a dividend to the parent, the parent does not pay 
any domestic tax since the amount of tax on the income already exceeds the amount of tax 
that would have been paid had the income been earned in the parent country.  When L pays a 
dividend to the parent, the parent includes the income (not the dividend) in its domestic 
taxable income.  The parent then receives a foreign tax credit which reduces its tax payable 
by the amount of the foreign tax that was paid.  At this point, the total amount of tax paid on 
the aggregate foreign income is higher than what would have been paid if the income all had 
been earned in the parent country (L’s was taxed at the parent’s rate, but H’s was taxed at a 
rate higher than the parent’s).  Cross-crediting allows the parent to reduce the amount of 
domestic tax payable on the earnings of L by the amount by which the tax paid in H’s 
country exceeds that which would have been paid if the income had been earned in the parent 
country.10,11  In a case in which the excess credit for tax paid by H fully offsets domestic tax 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
dividends collect no tax related to the foreign earnings and thus forego any offset of lost revenues, but a small number (e.g., 
Australia, Hong Kong, and Singapore) impose limits on the deductibility of expenses based on the scale of foreign 
investment.  In countries that tax 5% of foreign dividends, a parent receives dividends paid out of the after-tax earnings of 
its foreign subsidiaries, includes the non-exempt portion of the dividend in its taxable income, and does not receive a 
domestic credit for the foreign income tax paid.  For ease of exposition, I consider only the two extremes (fully exempt 
(territorial) and fully taxable (worldwide)) in this discussion. 
10 Cross-crediting is limited to the amount of domestic tax paid on the earnings of L and any excess credits can be carried 
forward. 
11 The system of cross-crediting described here is that of the U.S.  There are further restrictions on cross-crediting whereby 
credits can only be used to offset tax paid on income in a similar “basket”.  As of December, 2006 the U.S. system reduced 
from nine baskets based on industry to two baskets, passive and general.  In the UK, a system referred to as “Onshore 
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payable on the earnings of L, the taxation of L is identical to what it would be under a 
territorial system.  
 The foreign income is not included in the taxable income of the parent until the 
dividend is paid by the subsidiary to the parent.12  This principle, commonly referred to as 
deferral, introduces time value of money savings to the shifting.  In the extreme case in 
which the worldwide parent never repatriates the dividend from the foreign subsidiary, the 
taxation of the earnings of the low-tax subsidiary of the worldwide parent looks identical to 
that of the territorial parent.  Given the effect that cross-crediting and deferral can have on 
the tax paid on foreign income, it is not a given that the returns to shifting of a territorial 
parent are greater than those of a similar worldwide parent.   
2.2 The effect of international tax systems on income shifting 
In a recent survey of experienced partners and managers in the transfer pricing groups 
of two Big 4 accounting firms, Mescall (2010) asked two questions related to my research 
question.13 First, he asked if the tax system (worldwide vs. territorial) in which a 
multinational is based affects its transfer pricing incentives.  62% responded “yes”, 18% 
responded “no”, and 20% responded “unsure”.  Second, he asked if the practitioner would 
expect a multinational based in a worldwide tax system to be less aggressive than, more 
aggressive than, or equally aggressive as a firm based in a territorial system.  30% answered 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
Pooling” has been in place since March, 2001 and functions like the U.S. system.  Japan’s system is similar to that of the 
U.S.  Of the countries in the worldwide group in this study, only Poland limits foreign tax credits on a per-country basis. 
12 This is generally true only for active business income of the subsidiary (see Scholes, et al (2009) for a more detailed 
discussion).  All worldwide countries tax passive income of foreign subsidiaries as it is earned.  Ideally, I would be 
comparing the shifting of active income.  Unfortunately, I am not able to separate active and passive income in my data. 
13 The survey respondents are located in 32 different countries.  For more specific information about the survey and the 
respondents, see Mescall (2010).  I am grateful to Devan Mescall for sharing these data with me. 
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“less”, 31% answered “more”, and 39% answered “equally”.  At first glance, the two results 
appear contradictory and suggest that firms do not respond to incentives in expected ways.  
However, I infer from the results that, although the incentives of the territorial group 
dominate those of the worldwide group, constraints on the ability to respond to those 
incentives render predictions of behavior ambiguous.  I also interpret the results of the 
second question as saying that a worldwide system, in and of itself, is not an effective 
disciplining mechanism for the transfer pricing practices of its multinationals.   
Consistent with this interpretation, prior studies comparing the behaviors of 
worldwide and territorial firms have found mixed results.  I consider these studies in a 
framework suggested by Devereux and Maffini (2007) which characterizes the choices of 
firms wanting to access foreign markets as a four-step decision process: 1. A choice between 
producing at home and exporting and producing abroad; 2. A choice of where to locate 
production; 3. A choice of the scale of investment; and 4. A choice of the location of profit.  
Several previous studies have compared the tax sensitivities of territorial and worldwide 
firms in the second and third steps.  Slemrod (1990), Benassy-Quere et al (2000), Altshuler 
and Grubert (2001), and Hajkova et al (2006) find no difference in the location decisions of 
worldwide and territorial firms while Hines (1996), Wijeweera et al (2007), Barrios et al 
(2009), Clausing (2009), and Smart (2010) find that territorial firms are more sensitive to tax 
in their investment location decisions.14  To my knowledge, no previous study has compared 
                                                            
14 Other recent studies have made comparisons of worldwide and territorial firms in the context of organizational structure 
decisions.  Voget (2008) finds that worldwide multinationals are more likely to relocate their headquarters in response to tax 
rate incentives than are territorial multinationals, while Huizinga and Voget (2009) find the parent firm is more likely to be 
located in the territorial country following the merger of a territorial firm and a worldwide firm.   
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worldwide and territorial firms in step four (location of profit) and it remains an open 
question whether they differ in their tax-motivated income shifting.   
2.3 Hypotheses 
If all else is held constant, a territorial firm will save at least as much cash tax as a 
worldwide firm by shifting taxable income to a jurisdiction in which it will face a lower tax 
rate. The deferral provision can result in a convergence of the savings of the two groups 
when the worldwide firm is able to delay dividend repatriation indefinitely.  Cross-crediting 
can result in a convergence of the savings when the worldwide firm has excess credits 
because its income earned in low-tax jurisdictions will, in substance, be exempt from home-
country tax due to the application of the excess credit.  However, since these conditions for 
convergence are not always present, I predict that territorial firms, on average, shift more 
income than worldwide firms.  This leads to the first hypothesis, stated in the alternative: 
H1:  A multinational subject to a territorial tax regime shifts more income for tax 
reasons than does a similar multinational subject to a worldwide tax regime. 
 The deferral provision within the worldwide system delays the cash tax liability due 
on the active foreign earnings until they are repatriated to the parent as a dividend.  To the 
extent that a worldwide multinational is able to reinvest shifted income in the foreign 
jurisdiction and delay repatriation indefinitely, it moves closer economically to its territorial 
counterpart.  Based on this reasoning, I state my second hypothesis:15 
                                                            
15 Ideally, I would test a similar hypothesis about the effect of being in an excess credit position on the income shifting of 
worldwide firms.  Unfortunately, the data available to me do not allow me to calculate a reliable proxy for the foreign tax 
credit position of a firm and I am unable to conduct such tests.  Grubert and Mutti (2001) use confidential tax return data of 
U.S. multinationals to compare the shifting of excess credit firms to excess limit firms within a worldwide country and find 
no difference in the shifting of the two groups. 
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H2:  The difference in the tax-motivated income shifting of territorial and worldwide 
firms is decreasing in the reinvestment opportunities in the foreign country. 
 Hypothesis 2 examines the ability to defer by considering foreign reinvestment 
opportunities.  Another determinant of the ability to defer may be the need for cash in the 
parent’s home country.  In supporting his opinion that transfer pricing pressures would not 
increase if the U.S. adopted a territorial system, John M. Samuels said that under the current 
(worldwide with deferral) system “…a company can always repatriate all or any portion of 
its foreign earnings at any time it chooses, with the only cost of the repatriation being the 
same U.S. tax that it would have had to pay had if it had not shifted the income outside of the 
U.S. in the first place.” (Taxes, 2010)16  This assumes that cash constraints do not compel the 
company to undertake repatriations. If the shifted income will have to be returned to the 
parent country in the near future, the incentives to shift are reduced.  If a territorial parent 
requires cash in its home country, it can (in theory) shift income to a lower-tax country and 
immediately repatriate it to the parent, resulting in more cash in the parent country than if the 
shifting was not undertaken.  If a worldwide parent undertakes the same transaction, it ends 
up with the same amount of cash in the parent country whether the shifting is undertaken or 
not.  This leads to three separate but related hypotheses: 
H3a:  The tax-motivated income shifting of worldwide firms is decreasing in the cash 
constraints of the firm in its home country. 
H3b:  The tax-motivated income shifting of territorial firms is increasing in the cash 
constraints of the firm in its home country. 
                                                            
16 John M. Samuels is Vice President and Senior Counsel, Tax Policy and Planning of General Electric Corporation.  He 
made these remarks at the Tax Council Policy Institute’s 11th Annual Tax Policy & Practice Symposium in February, 2010 
(Taxes, 2010).  I thank Mr. Samuels for sharing his notes with me and for subsequent discussions. 
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H3c:  The difference in the tax-motivated income shifting of territorial and worldwide 
firms is increasing in the cash constraints of the firm in its home country. 
Finally, and related to H2, a worldwide firm faces a cost to repatriating dividends out 
of foreign earnings in the form of home country tax on the underlying income (net of foreign 
tax credits).  A territorial firm faces no such cost.  If the worldwide firm alters its repatriation 
decisions to defer the cost, it could end up having its cash trapped in jurisdictions with 
suboptimal rates of return.  Anecdotal evidence suggests that this theoretical difference plays 
out in real decisions.  Current estimates of the aggregate indefinitely reinvested foreign 
earnings of U.S. multinationals are over $1 trillion, an increase of 70% since 2006 (Drucker, 
2010).  In Japan, one of the main reasons for adopting a territorial system was to boost its 
domestic economy by encouraging repatriation (Taxes, 2010).  Consistent with this 
expectation, on May 18, 2010, the Nikkei English News reported that Japanese 
multinationals repatriated a record 3.14 trillion yen from foreign subsidiaries in 2009 (an 
increase of nearly 20% over the previous year) and attributed the increase to the change to a 
territorial system.17 
There is also empirical evidence that repatriation taxes affect the cash allocation 
decisions of U.S. multinationals. Foley et al. (2007) show that, in a sample of U.S. (i.e., 
worldwide) multinationals, firms hold more cash in foreign subsidiaries dividends from 
which would face higher repatriation taxes. In concurrent research, both Blouin, Krull and 
Robinson (2010) and Graham, Hanlon and Shevlin (2009) find that dividend repatriation 
                                                            
17 David Hartnett, Permanent Secretary for Tax, HM Revenue and Customs, said at a February, 2010 symposium that, 
following the change to an exempt system, the UK is “just waiting to see how large the wall of cash to come in is” (Taxes, 
2010). 
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decisions of U.S. multinationals are affected by the tax cost.18  Because such costs are zero 
for territorial firms, it is predicted that their repatriation decisions would be unconstrained. I 
state this prediction as my final hypothesis: 
H4:  The level of cash held in a foreign country is increasing in the difference in tax 
rates between parent and subsidiary country for worldwide firms and unrelated to 
the tax rate difference for territorial firms. 
                                                            
18 In both of these studies, a separate effect from the financial statement costs is identified.  Because the financial reporting 
consequences of shifting and deferring for a worldwide firm are identical to those of shifting for a territorial firm, there is no 
reason to expect a difference in financial reporting incentives. 
  
 
 
 
3. Research design 
3.1 Tests of Hypotheses 1, 2 and 3 
To test Hypotheses 1 - 3, I estimate various modifications of the following regression 
equation: 
ሺ1ሻ ܮ݋݃ܲܮܤ ௜ܶ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܶ ௜ܶ ൅ ߚଶܥ௜ ൅ ߚଷܶ ௜ܶ כ ܥ௜ ൅ ߚସܮ݋݃ܣܵܵܧܶ ௜ܵ ൅ ߚହܮ݋݃ܥܱܯ ௜ܲ           
൅  ߚ଺ܮ݋ܸ݃ܣ௜ ൅ ߚ଻ܵܶܣܤܫܮܫܶ ௜ܻ ൅ ߚ଼ܮܣ ௜ܹ ൅ ߝ௜  
 where  
ܮ݋݃ܲܮܤ ௜ܶ  is the natural logarithm of earnings before tax reported on the unconsolidated 
financial statements of subsidiary i. 
ܶ ௜ܶ  is an indicator variable equal to 1 if dividends paid by subsidiary i to its parent 
are either fully- or 95%-exempt from tax in the parent country; 0 otherwise. 
ܥ௜ is the measure of family-level tax incentive and opportunity derived by 
Huizinga and Laeven (2008) calculated as follows (see Appendix A for 
sample calculations): 
 ܥ௜ ൌ ଵሺଵିఛ೔ሻ
∑ ಳೖభషഓೖሺఛ೔ିఛೖሻ
೙ೖಯ೔
∑ ಳೖభషഓೖ
೙ೖసభ
 
where  
߬௜  is the statutory tax rate of subsidiary i.   ߬௞  is the statutory tax rate of subsidiary k, where k runs from 1 to n, 
where n is the number of subsidiaries controlled by the parent.  
ܤ௞ is the true profits of subsidiary k.  Revenue is used as a proxy.19 
 
ܮ݋݃ܣܵܵܧܶ ௜ܵ  is the natural logarithm of tangible fixed assets reported on the unconsolidated 
financial statements of subsidiary i. 
                                                            
19 A more appropriate proxy for true income would be total assets since operating revenue can be shifted.  Because operating 
revenue is available for more subsidiaries, I use it in my reported results and use total assets in sensitivity tests. Inferences 
are unchanged when total assets is used as the proxy for true income. 
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ܮ݋݃ܥܱܯ ௜ܲ  is the natural logarithm of compensation expense reported on the 
unconsolidated financial statements of subsidiary i. 
ܮ݋ܸ݃ܣ௜  is the natural logarithm of country-industry-specific value added (in millions 
of U.S. dollars) of the 2-digit NACE industry code of i.  Where multiple 
industries are being aggregated, a weighted average is taken with operating 
revenue providing the weights. 
ܵܶܣܤܫܮܫܶ ௜ܻ  is an index running from -2.5 to 2.5 from the Worldwide Governance 
Indicators (Kaufmann, et al., 2008).  The variable is designed to capture 
“perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or 
overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including domestic violence 
and terrorism.” 
ܮܣ ௜ܹ  is an index running from -2.5 to 2.5 from the Worldwide Governance 
Indicators (Kaufmann, et al., 2008).  The variable is designed to capture “the 
extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, 
and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, the police, and the 
courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence.” 
 
 
Equation 1 is based on the empirical model developed by Hines and Rice (1994), 
which begins with the premise that the profit reported by an entity is the sum of the true 
profit generated and any profit resulting from income shifting.20  Because true profit is 
unobservable, it must be estimated.  To derive their empirical model, Hines and Rice (1994) 
assume a Cobb-Douglas production function and arrive at an estimation model that expresses 
reported income as a function of labor and capital inputs, a general productivity component, 
and a measure of tax incentive.  Consistent with prior studies, I use ܮ݋݃ܥܱܯܲ and 
ܮ݋݃ܣܵܵܧܶܵ as the proxies for labor input and capital input, respectively.  As the proxy for 
general productivity, I use ܮ݋ܸ݃ܣ (which is at the country-industry level) rather than the 
natural logarithm of either the gross domestic product (GDP) or the per capita GDP of the 
                                                            
20 To address potential concerns related to scale in Equation 1, I run all main tests using alternative specifications in which I 
scale all financial statement variables by total assets and by total revenue (i.e., I replace LogPLBT, LogCOMP, and 
LogASSETS with PLBT/SCALAR, COMP/SCALAR, and ASSETS/SCALAR, respectively).  Inferences are unchanged when 
these specifications are used. 
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subsidiary country used in prior literature because it captures intra-country differences that 
are aggregated away by the GDP measures.21 
I add two additional variables to the model used by Huizinga and Laeven (2008), 
ܵܶܣܤܫܮܫܻܶ and ܮܣܹ. These variables are intended to capture subsidiary-country-level 
factors that could influence the amount of income a multinational reports in a country.  For 
example, if a firm has the tax incentive and opportunity to shift income into a country but 
that country’s instability puts the transferred income at risk, the expected return to shifting 
will be less than it would be in a more stable country.   
3.2 Tax variable 
The unit of observation in my empirical tests is an aggregation of all corporations in a 
country that are ultimately controlled by a common global ultimate owner.  Equation 1, then, 
says that the level of pretax income reported in a country is a function of the capital, labor 
and productivity inputs, the culture of the country, and the tax incentive to shift income into 
or out of the country.  As the tax incentive to shift income, I use the measure developed by 
Huizinga and Laeven (2008), ܥ, which captures the incentive to shift income among all 
countries in which the global ultimate owner operates, subject to constraints on the shifting.22  
In principle, ܥ is a weighted average of the tax rate differences from all other entities in the 
corporate family.  It is derived theoretically under three assumptions: that global after-tax 
profit of the multinational is maximized, that the cost of shifting into or out of a country is 
                                                            
21 Inferences remain the same when log(GDP) and log(per capita GDP) are used as the productivity proxy. 
22 Most studies prior to Huizinga and Laeven (2008) used a rate difference between the parent and subsidiary country as the 
proxy for incentive to shift income, thus ignoring both the opportunities to shift among subsidiary countries and the 
constraints on shifting. 
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increasing in the ratio of the shifted profit to true profit in the country, and that shifting costs 
are tax-deductible.  It is the second assumption that results in true income (ܤ) entering the 
weight and the third assumption that results in ሺ1 െ ߬௞ሻ entering the weight. 
Appendix A presents examples of how ܥ is calculated and how it varies with its 
inputs and from simple rate differences.  To convey its basic concepts, I provide a simple 
example here.  Consider two multinationals, M1 and M2, both domiciled in Country X (tax 
rate 40%) with subsidiaries in Country Y (tax rate 20%) and Country Z (10%).23  Next, 
assume that both M1 and M2 have exactly $100 of global true income, and that M1’s is 
allocated 70/20/10 among A/B/C while M2’s is allocated 10/20/70. ܥ௑ is equal to 0.09 for 
M1, while ܥ௑ is equal to 0.40 for M2.24  Both have a positive sign, which reflects an 
incentive to shift income out of X, but the magnitude of M2’s is more than four times that of 
M1.  M1’s ܥ௑ has a smaller magnitude because the portion of its true income that is in X is 
so large; while M1 has just as strong a rate incentive to shift income out of X, the income has 
to go somewhere and the costs of shifting it into Y and Z limit its shifting. 
Looking at the low-tax countries, M1’s ܥ௓ is equal to -0.27 and M2’s is equal to -
0.07.  In this case, the difference in magnitude can be thought of as being driven by the 
availability of income to be shifted into Z; M1 has a higher magnitude because its total costs 
(in all three countries) to shift a dollar into Z are less than those of M2.  This simple example 
reinforces the theoretical foundations of ܥ; it reflects the specific opportunity set of the 
                                                            
23 With no constraints on shifting, M1 and M2 would both shift all income out of X and Y into Z.  However, laws and 
enforcement mechanisms as well as costs related to the shifting itself will constrain the shifting. 
24 ଵሺଵି଴.ସሻ
మబ
భషబ.మሺ଴.ସି଴.ଶሻା
భబ
భషబ.భሺ଴.ସି଴.ଵሻళబ
భషబ.రା
మబ
భషబ.మା
భబ
భషబ.భ
ൌ 0.09 ;  ଵሺଵି଴.ସሻ
మబ
భషబ.మሺ଴.ସି଴.ଶሻା
ళబ
భషబ.భሺ଴.ସି଴.ଵሻభబ
భషబ.రା
మబ
భషబ.మା
ళబ
భషబ.భ
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multinational and its value is driven by both rate differences and differences in the allocation 
of true income. 
3.3 Test of Hypothesis 4 
 To test for differences in the relation between tax costs and cash held in foreign 
countries across the two groups, I estimate the following equation, adapted from that of Foley 
et al. (2007):25 
ܮ݋݃ܥܣܵܪ௜ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܶ ௜ܶ ൅ ߚଶܵܶܣܶܦܫܨܨ௜ ൅ ߚଷܶ ௜ܶ כ ܵܶܣܶܦܫܨܨ௜  
൅ߚସܮ݋݃ܰܫ௜ ൅ ߚହܮ݋݃ܣܵܵܧܶ ௜ܵ ൅ ߚ଺ܵݐ݀݁ݒܰܫ௜ ൅ ߚ଻ܥܣܲܧ ௜ܺ                   
൅ߚ଻ܮܧ ௜ܸ ൅ ߚ଼ܴܦ௜ ൅ ߚଽܦܱܯ_ܴܦ௜ ൅ ߝ௜                                                 ሺ2ሻ 
 where  
ܮ݋݃ܥܣܵܪ௜  is the natural logarithm of (cash/total assets) reported on the unconsolidated 
financial statements of subsidiary i. 
ܶ ௜ܶ  is an indicator variable equal to 1 if dividends paid by subsidiary i to its 
parent are either fully- or 95%-exempt from tax in the parent country; 0 
otherwise. 
ܵܶܣܶܦܫܨܨ௜  is the statutory rate of the parent less the statutory rate of subsidiary i; set to 
0 if negative. 
ܮ݋݃ܰܫ௜  is the natural logarithm of (net income/total assets) reported on the 
unconsolidated financial statements of subsidiary i. 
ܮ݋݃ܣܵܵܧܶ ௜ܵ  is the natural logarithm of total assets reported on the unconsolidated 
financial statements of subsidiary i. 
ܵݐ݀݁ݒܰܫ௜  is the standard deviation of (net income/total assets) reported on the 
unconsolidated financial statements of subsidiary i in years 2001 – 2006. 
                                                            
25 Foley et al. (2007) include the ratio of research and development expense to total assets as an independent variable.  As 
R&D is not available in my data, I use intangible fixed assets as a proxy.  Also, they use a country tax rate as their proxy for 
tax cost of repatriation because all of the parents in their sample were domiciled in the U.S. and faced the same statutory tax 
rate.  Because my parents are in different countries, I use the difference in rates.  Lastly, Orbis does not have data on capital 
expenditures.  I estimate it as (ending tangible fixed assets – beginning tangible fixed assets + depreciation). 
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ܥܣܲܧ ௜ܺ  is (capital expenditures/total assets) reported on the unconsolidated 
financial statements of subsidiary i. 
ܮܧ ௜ܸ  is ((current liabilities + long-term debt)/total assets) reported on the 
unconsolidated financial statements of subsidiary i. 
ܴܦ௜  is (intangible fixed assets/total assets) reported on the unconsolidated 
financial statements of subsidiary i. 
ܦܱܯ_ܴܦ௜  is (intangible fixed assets/total assets) reported by the ultimate owner of 
subsidiary i in its home country. 
  
 
 
 
4. Data 
4.1 Financial statement and ownership data 
Financial statement and ownership data are taken from the Orbis database maintained 
by Bureau van Dijk.  Up to ten years of financial statement data are available and are 
reported in U.S. dollars.  The ownership data are static as of the most recent report date.  
Because the tax rate and tax law data used in the study are current as of January 1, 2007, I 
use 2006 as the sample year on the assumption that it is the year with the fewest mismatches 
of the various data sources.26   
Global Ultimate Owners 
Orbis identifies a firm as a Global Ultimate Owner (GUO) if it controls at least one 
subsidiary and is itself not controlled by any other single entity.  I begin creating my sample 
with a list of all GUOs in the database.  I then create a list of subsidiaries that are identified 
as being ultimately controlled by each GUO in the sample.27 For each subsidiary, I obtain its 
country of domicile and all needed financial statement variables.28   
Aggregation 
                                                            
26 January 1, 2007 is the most recent date at which the proprietary information on the bilateral relationships between 
countries obtained for the study were available to me.  
27 A subsidiary is considered ultimately controlled by the GUO if all links in the ownership chain between it and the GUO 
have ownership percentages greater than 50%.  As such, subsidiaries of all levels are included in the sample.  For example, 
if GUO A owns 100% of B and B owns 75% of C which owns 25% of D, B and C would be counted as ultimately owned by 
A while D would not. 
28 In Orbis, the country of domicile is based on the primary trading address of the firm.  The country of incorporation is also 
available in the data.  In my sample, there are no observations for which the country of primary trading address and country 
of incorporation are different. 
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Organizational structure can vary widely among multinationals.  For example, one 
firm may choose to operate through one subsidiary in each country while an otherwise 
similar firm may choose to use multiple subsidiaries in each country.  Or one firm may 
choose to own all of its subsidiaries directly while a similar firm may have more complex 
ownership structures.  To enable comparisons across all possible structures, I aggregate all 
subsidiaries controlled by the same GUO at the country level.29  For ease of exposition, I 
continue to refer to these aggregated groups as subsidiaries throughout the remainder of the 
paper.  The corporate group to be studied, then, consists of a GUO and the portfolio of 
countries in which it has controlled subsidiaries and income shifting is presumed to be 
possible among all members of the group.30 
All financial statement variables are summed by country since they are drawn from 
unconsolidated statements. The proxy for productivity I use is the country-industry-specific 
value added for 2006.31  To calculate an aggregate value for all entities within a given 
country, I take the weighted average of the value added of each entity’s industry, with the 
weights provided by the operating revenues of the entities.   
Common-parent subsidiaries 
                                                            
29 A subsidiary is included if it has unconsolidated data for all variables in Equation 1 for 2006 and it is not in a service, 
financial, or insurance industry.  These industries are excluded on the assumption that the empirical model of true income is 
not well specified for them.  When these industries are included in the sample, inferences remain largely unchanged. 
30 In additional untabulated tests, I use the total ownership percentage that the GUO has in the subsidiary rather than relying 
on the links within Orbis and include only subsidiaries with various minimum ownership percentages.  The percentages 
tested are 100%, 90%, 70% and 60%.  Inferences from these tests are not different from those reported. 
31 This variable is obtained from the OECD STAN database.  The specific variable I use is VALU, the value added at 
current prices. 
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Subsidiaries that do not have all data items required to be in the sample contribute to 
the calculation of the tax incentive variable (ܥ) if they report operating revenue for 2006. 
There are 5,611 parents in 51 countries that have at least one subsidiary in the sample.  For 
these parents, the number of common-parent (sample) subsidiaries is 28,513 (15,546).32  The 
number of common-parent (sample) subsidiary countries is 67 (31).   
4.1.1  Example of data 
I provide the following example to illustrate how the data in Orbis end up 
contributing to the calculation of the variables.  Parco, a global ultimate owner, is domiciled 
in France.  It has 11 subsidiaries distributed across four countries as follows: five in France, 
three in The Netherlands, two in the U.S., and one in Bermuda.  The unconsolidated financial 
statements of Parco are also available, meaning there are 12 entities in total.  Ideally, all 12 of 
them are included in Orbis, are identified as ultimately controlled by Parco, and have the 
financial statement variables needed to be included as sample firms.  If this is the case, then 
the six (parent plus five subsidiaries) companies in France are aggregated into ParcoFrance, the 
three in The Netherlands are aggregated into ParcoNetherlands, and the two in the U.S. into 
ParcoUS.  The subsidiary in Bermuda is ParcoBermuda.  Each of these aggregated “subsidiaries” 
is then an observation in the dataset, meaning Parco contributes four observations to the 
sample. 
For the calculation of ܥ for a given observation, the other three subsidiaries serve as 
common-parent subsidiaries for the subsidiary whose ܥ is being calculated.  For example, 
                                                            
32 As noted previously, the term “subsidiary” here represents the aggregation of all corporations within a country. 
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ܥ௉௔௥௖௢ே௘௧௛௘௥௟௔௡ௗ௦ would be calculated with the true incomes and tax rates of ParcoFrance, 
ParcoUS, and ParcoBermuda in the numerator. 
There are three grades of limitations to the data.  First, Orbis could not know that the 
corporation exists or could fail to link it as ultimately owned by its GUO.  In either case, the 
corporation is not included in the study.  Second, the corporation could have no financial 
statement data (i.e., all that is known about the corporation is that it exists and that the GUO 
ultimately controls it).  These corporations do not contribute either to the sample or to the 
calculation of ܥ, but they contribute to calculations of the completeness of the data that is 
used.  Third, the corporation could have data for operating revenue, but not for all of the 
regression variables (i.e., pretax income, tangible fixed assets and employment costs).  These 
corporations contribute to the calculation of ܥ for the other subsidiaries controlled by the 
same GUO, but are not included as sample observations. 
4.2 Classification of subsidiaries 
To determine the effect of foreign dividend taxation on income shifting, I would 
ideally use a continuous variable equal to the percentage of dividends that are taxed.  
However, as noted previously, countries have clustered into two groups (territorial and 
worldwide), denying me the opportunity to use a continuous experimental variable.33  A 
subsidiary is classified as territorial if its dividends would be either fully- or 95%-exempt 
                                                            
33 The only countries of which I am aware that do not either fully exempt, exempt 95%, or fully tax foreign income are 
Belarus (which taxes 62.5% of dividends from all countries), Czech Republic (which taxes 62.5% of dividends from most 
non-European countries and exempts dividends from most European countries), Israel (which taxes 81% of dividends from 
all countries except Singapore and The Netherlands, dividends from which are exempt), and Pakistan (which taxes 54% of 
dividends from all countries).  There are 35 usable observations for Israel in my data.  However, they are excluded from the 
analyses.  When those 35 observations are included in the worldwide group, results are unchanged.  The Czech Republic is 
included in the sample as a territorial country because all sample subsidiaries with it as the parent country are in Europe. 
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from home country tax if paid directly to its Global Ultimate Owner.  A subsidiary is 
classified as worldwide if its income is fully taxable in the country of the GUO.34  To classify 
country pairs more precisely, I obtain detailed proprietary information on each country pair 
from Comtax.35  Comtax synthesizes the information in countries’ tax codes as well as the 
bilateral tax treaties that exist between countries to determine what percentage of foreign 
dividends are taxed when paid from the subsidiary country to the parent country. This 
information enables me to classify each subsidiary as worldwide or territorial rather than 
assuming that all subsidiaries of parents in the same country fall in the same category.  This 
is potentially important because countries do not treat income from all foreign countries the 
same. For example, Belgium exempts 95% of dividends from all countries except Poland 
(dividends from which are fully exempt), British Virgin Islands, Gibraltar, Iran, Isle of Man, 
Jersey, Liechtenstein, Monaco, Oman and Panama (dividends from which are fully taxable). 
4.3 Sample 
Table 1 summarizes how each country contributes to the parents, sample subsidiaries, 
and common-parent subsidiaries in the sample.  The statutory tax rate (which includes sub-
national income tax for a representative firm in the country – for example, the U.S. rate of 
40% is comprised of the 35% federal rate and the 5% rate of a firm in New York State) as of 
                                                            
34 Under this classification system, a subsidiary in Malaysia that is controlled by a firm in the Netherlands (a territorial 
country) which is itself controlled by a U.S. (worldwide) GUO would be classified as worldwide even though its dividends, 
when paid directly to its immediate parent in the Netherlands, would be exempt from tax.  This assumption is necessary 
because corporate structures can vary widely across multinationals.  In the sample, 90.1% of the subsidiaries that get 
aggregated together are controlled directly (i.e., with no third country between the GUO country and the subsidiary country).  
When tests are run using only these subsidiaries, inferences are unchanged. 
35 Comtax is an international tax planning company based in Sweden that produces software intended to help companies 
structure transactions tax efficiently.   
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January 1, 2007 is reported in the first column.36,37  The other three columns report the 
number of parents, sample subsidiaries, and common-parent subsidiaries domiciled in each 
country.38 
Summary statistics for the sample are reported in Table 2.  Panel A reports the 
number of observations, mean, median, maximum, minimum and standard deviation for the 
regression variables for the full sample divided into two subsamples: territorial and 
worldwide.  Panel B reports the means by country of domicile of the subsidiary.  Panel C 
reports the means by country of domicile of the parent.  Panel D of Table 2 reports the 
distribution of sample observations across subsidiary countries by parent country.39     
Panel A shows that the sample is made up of 9,962 territorial subsidiaries, and 5,584 
worldwide subsidiaries.  Unfortunately, this uneven distribution is a function of data 
availability (the most complete financial statement data in Orbis are for European countries 
which, with the exception of the UK and Greece, use territorial systems) rather than the 
distribution of countries (53 of the 109 countries (49%) included in the Comtax database are 
territorial), or the distribution of income (67% of global GDP in 2006 was in worldwide 
                                                            
36 These rates are largely unchanged from January 1, 2006.  Of the parent countries with more than 30 observations in my 
sample, only The Netherlands (30% at 1/1/06 and 26% at 1/1/07) had a different rate. 
37 A limitation of using statutory rates is that it ignores distribution taxes.  Several countries (e.g., Austria, Japan, Poland, 
Portugal, Chile and South Africa) have increased distribution taxes (which can be structured as a separate final tax or a 
withholding tax) as corporate rates have fallen as a means of equalizing the rate on distributed dividends with the top 
personal rate in the country.  Because I am unable to separate distributed income from retained income in my data, I am 
forced to ignore differences in distribution taxes. 
38 The sample subsidiaries are a subset of common-parent subsidiaries. 
39 Countries are not included in Panel B if they have fewer than 50 observations. All observations are included in Panels A, 
C and D and in all regressions unless otherwise noted. 
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countries).40  The worldwide subsidiaries are larger, on average, than those in the territorial 
group.  As discussed by Huizinga and Laeven (2008), it is not surprising that the median 
value of ܥ, the tax incentive variable, is close to zero in each of the subsamples since it is a 
weighted average of bilateral tax differences within a corporate group.  The range of ܥ in my 
sample (-0.35 to 0.35) is consistent with that in Huizinga and Laeven (2008) (-0.43 to 0.53).   
 Panel B of Table 2 reports the means of the variables grouped by subsidiary country.  
The first column (N) reports the number of observations and confirms that the sample is 
dominated by European subsidiaries.  The second column (# parent countries) reports the 
number of different countries parents from which have subsidiaries in the given country.  For 
example, the 204 Austrian subsidiaries are owned by parents in 24 different countries.  The 
column %Territorial reports the percentage of subsidiaries in the given country that are 
owned by GUOs domiciled in territorial countries.  The final seven columns report the means 
of the regression variables for each country.   
Panel C of Table 2 reports the means of the variables grouped by parent country.  The 
parents also are dominated by European countries, but subsidiaries of parents from non-
European countries combine to represent 36% of the sample.  In this panel, the second 
column reports the number of parents (i.e., Global Ultimate Owners) domiciled in the given 
country having subsidiaries in the sample.  For example, the first row reports that 30 different 
Australian GUOs have a total of 80 subsidiaries in the sample.    
                                                            
40 Bureau van Dijk obtains most of its financial statement data from the compulsory filings of corporations.  Most European 
countries require private companies to file annual reports while other countries (e.g., the U.S.) do not have such 
requirements.  Further details on the data sources and collection procedures can be obtained at the Bureau van Dijk website 
(www.bvdep.com).  
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Panel D of Table 2 reports the distribution of sample observations across subsidiary 
countries by parent country, reporting only those parent countries with at least 500 
observations.  All numbers except the first column (N) are percentages.  For example, 
looking at the Belgium column, 31% of the 573 subsidiaries that have a Belgian parent are in 
Belgium and 1% are in Bulgaria.  
Table 3 reports the Pearson (above the diagonal) and Spearman correlations for the 
regression variables.   
  
 
 
 
5. Results 
5.1 Tests of Hypothesis 1 
5.1.1  Cross-sectional tests 
To establish consistency with prior results, I first estimate Equation 1 on the full 
sample without the indicator variable (ܶܶ) and interaction term (ܶܶ כ ܥ).  Table 4, Model 1 
presents the results.  The coefficient estimates on the labor and capital proxies and the tax 
variable, ܥ (-1.12), are similar to those estimated in other studies using U.S. data only 
(Blouin et al, 2009) and European data only (Huizinga and Laeven, 2008) from different time 
periods.41 
 Having established consistency with prior results in my data, I now proceed to the 
main tests of the paper.  Models 2 and 3 in Table 4 present the results of estimating Equation 
1 on the full sample, first without the two subsidiary-country variables (Model 2) and then 
with them. Focusing on Model 3, the estimate of the coefficient on ܥ is negative (-0.47) and 
significant.  Since ܥ is calculated such that a negative value indicates a tax incentive to shift 
income in to the subsidiary subject to constraints, a negative relation with reported income is 
interpreted as tax-motivated income shifting.  The estimate of the coefficient on ܶܶ כ ܥ is 
                                                            
41 To control for the effect of outliers, I use robust regression, which uses an iterative approach to assign weights to each 
observation.  Observations that are assigned a zero weight are not included in the final regression.  This results in small 
variations in the N reported in different models using the same sample. 
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negative (-0.88) and significant, meaning that territorial subsidiaries shift more income than 
worldwide subsidiaries, all else equal.42   
The relative difference in magnitude is large, with the total slope coefficient for 
territorial firms nearly three times that of worldwide firms.  In terms of economic magnitude, 
the estimate of the coefficient on ܥ of -0.47 in Model 2 indicates that as a worldwide 
subsidiary’s tax incentive goes from 0.1 to 0.2 (i.e., its incentive to shift out becomes 
greater), the natural log of its pretax income (in thousands of U.S. dollars) will decrease by 
0.047.  At the mean ܮ݋݃ܲܮܤܶ of 7.84, this translates into a reduction in reported income of 
$117,000 (from $2,540,000 to $2,423,000), or 4.6%.  The estimate of the coefficient of 
ܶܶ כ ܥ of -0.88 indicates that as a territorial subsidiary’s tax incentive goes from 0.1 to 0.2, 
the natural log of its pretax income will decrease by 0.135 (-0.047 + -0.088 = -0.135), which 
translates to a reduction in pretax income of 12.6% ($321,000).     
On the surface, these results provide a clear answer to the primary question of the 
study: territorial multinationals shift more income than do worldwide multinationals with the 
same tax incentives and opportunities. The difference is both statistically and economically 
significant.  To test the sensitivity of this result to the assumptions made, I conduct additional 
tests using alternate designs. 
5.1.2  Within-country tests 
One limitation of the research design employed in the previous test is that the primary 
variables (ܥ and ܶܶ כ ܥ) are country-level variables and could be correlated with other 
                                                            
42 Recall that ܶܶ is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the global ultimate owner of the subsidiary in the observation would be 
exempt from domestic tax on the subsidiary’s income if the dividend were paid directly from the subsidiary to the GUO. 
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characteristics of the country that could be driving the result.  To address this concern, I 
conduct a second test of H1 by estimating Equation 1 on time series data for a country that 
changed from a worldwide system to a territorial one.  Prior to Japan and the UK (post-
change data for which are not yet available), the last country to make such a change was 
Norway, which changed from fully taxing to fully exempting income from most countries on 
January 1, 2004.  To test for differences in income shifting around this change, I collect data 
for all Norwegian Global Ultimate Owners and their subsidiaries for the years 2000 to 2005, 
inclusive, and estimate Equation 1.  Unfortunately, there are data for only 91 Norwegian 
multinationals over this period, limiting the statistical power of the tests.    I rename the 
territorial indicator variable (ܶܶ) ܱܲܵܶ03 for consistency with a subsequent test. ܱܲܵܶ03 is 
equal to 1 for observations in years after 2003 (i.e., years in which Norwegian multinationals 
were subject to a territorial regime). Results are presented in the left half of Table 5. 
The column headings of Table 5 indicate the subsample that is used in the respective 
tests.  The first two columns use all available observations, with the first establishing that the 
sample firms engage in tax-motivated income shifting (as evidenced by the negative 
coefficient on ܥ), and the second introducing the ܱܲܵܶ03 split.  The coefficient on 
ܱܲܵܶ03 כ ܥ is negative, indicating that the sample firms shifted more when under a 
territorial regime than when under a worldwide regime.  The estimate is not statistically 
significant.  As the statistical power of the sample to identify differences in the two periods is 
limited, I estimate the model on subsamples which exclude observations in the transitional 
period on the assumption that they may be muting differences if firms have altered their 
behavior in anticipation of the change or took time after the change to implement changes.  
The third column excludes 2003, the year prior to the change.  The coefficients on both ܥ and 
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the interaction term remain negative, though neither is statistically significant.  Similar 
results are reported in the final column when both the year prior to and the year following the 
change are excluded. 
The primary concern with this time-series test is that the interaction term is simply 
capturing an increasing time trend in tax-motivated income shifting. My ability to conduct 
reliable robustness tests (e.g., regressions by year) using these Norwegian data is limited by 
the small sample size.  To address this concern, I repeat the test using all available data for 
Swedish multinationals in the same period.  I choose Sweden because it is a Scandinavian 
country with the same corporate tax rate (28%, identical to that of Norway) over the period, it 
had a territorial system for the entire period, and it has a large amount of data available.  If 
the coefficient estimate on the interaction term in the Norway sample is capturing a time 
effect, the same result should be obtained in the Sweden sample. 
The results are presented in the right half of Table 5.  The coefficient estimate for ܥ is 
negative in all three subsamples, indicating that Swedish multinationals engaged in tax-
motivated income shifting in 2000 – 2003.  The estimate on ܱܲܵܶ03 כ ܥ is positive and 
insignificant, indicating there was not an increase in tax-motivated income shifting after 
January 1, 2004.  This result provides indirect support that the negative coefficient in the 
Norway sample is evidence of an increase in shifting following the adoption of a territorial 
system. 
5.2 Robustness of results for H1 
5.2.1 Controlled foreign corporation rules 
The main variable of interest in the tests described in Table 4 is the interaction of the 
territorial indicator variable (ܶܶ) and the tax variable (ܥ).  As noted above, the fact that ܶܶ is 
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a country-level variable is problematic if it is correlated with other factors that could also 
explain variation in reported income.  Most countries impose restrictions on their 
multinationals intended to limit their ability to avoid tax in abusive ways.  The most common 
such restriction is a controlled foreign corporation (CFC) rule.  CFC rules allow the taxing 
authority to override the otherwise applicable tax law on an entity-by-entity basis when 
certain specific conditions are met.43  A binary division of countries along this dimension is 
not straightforward because the trigger points for CFC rules vary across countries. However, 
accepting the inherent imprecision, I code an indicator variable, ܱܰܥܨܥ = 1 if the country 
does not have explicit CFC rules.44 I first substitute ܱܰܥܨܥ for ܶܶ in Equation 1 and then 
augment the original Equation 1 with ܱܰܥܨܥ and its interaction terms to determine if the 
results presented in Table 4 are sensitive to this additional control.  I expect multinationals 
based in countries with no CFC rules to shift more than those in countries with CFC rules 
(i.e., that the coefficient estimate on ܱܰܥܨܥ כ ܥ will be negative). Results are presented in 
Table 6. 
Model 1 is a duplicate of Model 3 from Table 4 and is included for comparison 
purposes.  Model 2 presents the results of estimating Equation 1 with ܱܰܥܨܥ substituted for 
ܶܶ.   The estimate on ܥ is -0.71 and significant, indicating that multinationals domiciled in 
countries with CFC rules shift income for tax purposes.  The estimate of the coefficient on 
ܱܰܥܨܥ כ ܥ is also negative (-1.19) and significant, indicating that, as predicted, 
                                                            
43 For example, France’s law contains a CFC provision stating that income earned in a low-tax foreign country may be 
ineligible for the 95% exemption if certain conditions are met (e.g., the effective tax rate is less than 2/3 of the French rate).  
Such determinations are made on an entity-by-entity basis rather than a country-by-country basis.  That is, a French parent 
could have two subsidiaries in Bermuda and one of them could trigger the CFC rule and one of them could not. 
44 I use ܱܰܥܨܥ rather than its complement, ܥܨܥ (=1 if the country has CFC rules), so that predicted signs will be consistent 
with those of ܶܶ. 
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multinationals not subject to CFC rules engage in more income shifting.  To determine 
whether the lack of CFC rules explains the difference in the shifting of worldwide and 
territorial firms documented in Table 4, I next include both ܶܶ and ܱܰܥܨܥ in the same 
regression.  Results are presented in Model 3 of Table 6.45 The coefficient estimate on ܶܶ כ ܥ 
remains negative (-0.60) and significant, evidence that the difference in shifting between 
territorial and worldwide firms found in the main tests is robust to controlling for the 
presence of CFC rules. 
5.2.2 Data coverage 
As discussed in Section 4.1.1, a corporation will not be included in the data which is 
aggregated and then used to calculate ܥ if it does not have operating revenue reported in 
Orbis.  To ensure that such missing data do not affect inferences, I calculate two proportions 
for each observation: the number of corporations ultimately controlled by the GUO reporting 
positive operating revenue as a fraction of the total number of subsidiaries ultimately 
controlled by the GUO, and the number of countries in which the GUO has ultimately-
controlled corporations with positive operating revenue as a fraction of the total number of 
countries in which the GUO has ultimately-controlled corporations.  The mean (median) 
values of the two proportions in the full sample are 0.47 (0.40) and 0.68 (0.67), respectively.  
In untabulated tests, I restrict the sample to observations with various thresholds for both the 
subsidiary-level and country-level proportions.  Inferences remain unchanged up to the 0.50 
(0.75) threshold for the subsidiary-level (country-level) proportion.  Beyond these thresholds 
                                                            
45 Because there are fewer than 200 observations that have ܶܶ =0 and ܱܰܥܨܥ =1 (i.e., I do not have enough observations 
from worldwide countries that do not have CFC rules), I exclude ܱܰܥܨܥ and ܱܰܥܨܥ כ ܥ from the model and am 
effectively comparing the income shifting of three groups: worldwide firms, territorial firms subject to CFC rules, and 
territorial firms not subject to CFC rules.   
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(i.e., when only GUOs having data for at least 50% of their total subsidiaries or 75% of the 
countries in which it operates), the estimate of the coefficient on ܶܶ כ ܥ becomes positive 
and is not statistically significant. 
5.2.3 Regressions by parent country 
In grouping countries by their taxation of foreign dividends for the tests reported in 
Table 4, an assumption was made that there were no fundamental differences in the countries 
that would affect the propensity to shift income.46  To test the validity of this assumption, I 
estimate Equation 1 (without ܶܶ and ܶܶ כ ܥ) by country for parent countries having at least 
600 observations.  Results are presented in Table 7.   The first column (Full sample) uses the 
full sample (i.e., not just observations from the nine countries reported in the table) and is 
included for comparison purposes.47 The remaining columns present results using only 
observations of multinationals domiciled in the country listed in the column heading.  For 
eight (seven) of the nine countries, the estimate of the coefficient on ܥ is negative (negative 
and significant), which is interpreted as evidence of tax-motivated income shifting. Only 
Japan does not have a negative estimate for ܥ.  In fact, the estimate for Japan is positive and 
significant.48  The estimates of ܥ range from -2.04 (Switzerland) to 0.79 (Japan), with a mean 
of -0.94 and a standard deviation of 0.89.49  These estimates are consistent with 
multinationals domiciled in all countries except Japan engaging in tax-motivated income 
                                                            
46 For example, if a significant portion of the territorial subsample was comprised of firms domiciled in countries that allow 
extreme amounts of income shifting, the difference being attributed to the worldwide/territorial split may be driven by those 
extreme observations. 
47 This test is identical to that reported in Model 1 of Table 4 except that it includes ܵܶܣܤܫܮܫܻܶ and ܮܣܹ. 
48 As discussed by Collins et al (1998), a positive coefficient is not evidence of shifting income to pay more tax, but rather is 
evidence that the non-tax factors affecting income shifting dominate the tax factors. 
49 With Japan excluded, the mean is -1.02 and the standard deviation is 0.58. 
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shifting.  Because Japan represents 20% (7%) of the worldwide (total) observations in the 
sample, it could be driving the observed difference in shifting across the two groups, and thus 
requires further investigation. 
5.3 The case of Japan 
 The finding that Japan is an outlier in tax planning is consistent with the finding in 
Markle and Shackelford (2010) that Japanese multinationals have had higher effective tax 
rates than multinationals in other countries for the last two decades.  Unfortunately, Markle 
and Shackelford (2010) find no explanation for how or why Japan has remained an outlier 
among the major economies of the world for so long and suggest that future research on the 
topic is needed. I first examine the data to determine if there might be something different 
about the Japanese sample that was drawn.  As reported in Panel D of Table 2, the 
distribution of the 1,104 Japanese observations in the sample is consistent with those of the 
other parent countries.  The correlation between the percentage of observations in each 
country for the whole sample and for Japan when sample subsidiaries in Japan are excluded 
(i.e., between the %All column and the Japan column) is 86%, indicating that there is nothing 
anomalous about the distribution of Japanese observations in the sample.50   
I next investigate two broad categories of country-level characteristics that could 
drive differences in observed income shifting: transfer pricing rules and culture. 
                                                            
50 In untabulated tests, I estimate Equation 1 on a subsample that includes only foreign subsidiaries.  Inferences from these 
tests are unchanged from those from the tests on the full sample. 
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5.3.1  Transfer pricing rules 
Most countries adopt transfer pricing rules that are based on the OECD transfer 
pricing guidelines (OECD, 2009), which recommend the arm’s length method as the general 
basis for determining appropriate transfer prices.51  However, while countries have the 
OECD guidelines as a common starting point, they can differ in both the application and 
enforcement of their transfer pricing rules as a whole. In concurrent research, Mescall (2010) 
develops a 16-point index which he uses to measure the strictness of a country’s transfer 
pricing rules.  Because he observes countries clustering at two points on the index, he 
reduces the index to an indicator variable equal to 1 if the country has strict transfer pricing 
practices, 0 otherwise.  For 2005, 15 of the 27 countries in his sample are coded as having 
strict practices.  Japan is one of the 12 considered to have unstrict practices.   
To determine if these differences across parent countries may affect the inferences of 
the main tests, I code an indicator variable, ܷܴܰܵܶܫܥܶ =1 if the parent country is judged to 
have unstrict transfer pricing practices by Mescall (2010).  I include ܷܴܰܵܶܫܥܶ  and 
ܷܴܰܵܶܫܥܶ כ ܥ in Equation 1 and estimate the model on the full sample and a subsample 
which excludes observations having Japan as the parent company.  Results are presented in 
Table 8.  The first pair of columns presents the results of estimating on the full sample and 
the non-Japan subsample without the new indicator variable.  With Japan excluded, the 
coefficient on ܶܶ כ ܥ remains negative and significant, but the relative magnitudes of the 
                                                            
51 As the name suggests, the arm’s length method uses the price that unrelated and self-interested parties would agree on as 
the basis for determining the appropriateness of a price used for transfers among commonly-controlled entities.  For further 
details, see OECD (2009). 
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coefficients on C (-0.95) and the total slope coefficient on ܥ for territorial firms (-0.95 + -
0.51 = -1.46) change substantially from those in the full sample. 
Moving to the middle pair of columns in Table 8, which present the results of 
estimating the model including ܷܴܰܵܶܫܥܶ and ܷܴܰܵܶܫܥܶ כ ܥ on the two samples, we see 
that the inferences taken from the estimates of the coefficients on ܥ and ܶܶ כ ܥ do not 
change when the control for transfer pricing practices is included.  In neither sample is the 
estimate on ܷܴܰܵܶܫܥܶ כ ܥ statistically significant. I conclude from this that the strictness of 
transfer pricing rules, as measured by Mescall (2010), does not affect the relative amounts of 
income shifting of the two groups. 
There is a difference in Japanese tax law that may partially explain the lack of 
evidence of shifting using my research design.  As documented by Gramlich, et al (2004), 
Japanese law dictates that arm’s length prices must be used for transactions between 
Japanese companies and their foreign affiliates, but does not have the same requirement for 
transactions between domestic Japanese companies.  Gramlich, et al (2004) hypothesize and 
find that Japanese firms that are members of keiretsu engage in more within-Japan shifting 
than independent firms.52  It is possible, then, that Japanese firms engage in less cross-
jurisdiction income shifting because they have more domestic shifting opportunities than 
firms in other countries.  Unfortunately, I do not have access to the data necessary to test this 
hypothesis. 
                                                            
52 From Gramlich, et al (2004): “Keiretsu … represent diversified groups of manufacturing and trading firms that share the 
same financial institutions and adopt coordinated business strategies. … keiretsu members benefit from distribution and 
production arrangements, dominant access to markets, and low-cost flexible financing.”  
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5.3.2  Cultural differences 
Beyond any statutory restrictions countries impose on the practices of their 
multinational corporations, anecdotal evidence suggests that there may be cultural 
differences between countries (and between Japan and the rest of the countries in the study in 
particular) that could drive differences in observed income shifting.53 Acknowledging that 
concepts such as culture are difficult to measure, I again use as proxies the World 
Governance Indicators (WGI) produced by the World Bank (Kaufmann et al, 2008).  
Kaufmann et al (2008) calculate an index running from -2.5 to 2.5 for six variables such that 
a higher value indicates better governance.  I multiply their values by -1 so that predicted 
signs are consistent with my previous tests.  I run the test with each of their six variables but, 
as results are qualitatively the same using any of the six, I report only the results using 
ܥܱܴܴܷܲܶ.54  Results are reported in the last pair of columns of Table 8. 
As with the results when the transfer pricing strictness variable was included, the 
inferences about differences between worldwide and territorial firms are unchanged when 
this additional control is included.  The sign on ܥܱܴܴܷܲܶ כ ܥ is negative, indicating that 
tax-motivated income shifting is increasing in the level of corruption in the parent country, 
but it is not statistically significant. 
                                                            
53 According to a Library of Congress Country Study, Japanese culture highly values both loyalty and respect for authority. 
“Leadership stemmed from the government and authority in general, and business looked to government for guidance.  
These attitudes, coupled with the view of the nation as a family, allowed government to influence business, and business 
worked hard not only for their own profits but also for national well-being. Thus, the relationship between government and 
business was as collaborators rather than as mutually suspicious adversaries.” (Library of Congress, 1994). 
54 The following is the definition of the corruption variable taken directly from Kaufmann et al (2007):  “measuring 
perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of 
corruption, as well as “capture” of the state by elites and private interests.”  As noted, I multiply their value by -1 so that the 
value of the ܥܱܴܴܷܲܶ in my tests is increasing in the level of corruption in the parent country.   
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Taken as a whole, the results in Table 8 support the conclusion that territorial firms 
shift more income than worldwide firms, regardless of country-level differences in cultural 
norms.  Unfortunately, these additional tests do not provide an explanation for why the 
income shifting of Japanese multinationals differs from that of all other countries.  In fact, 
these tests provide further evidence that the lack of income shifting in Japan is anomalous; 
despite being subject to less strict transfer pricing rules than firms that shift income for tax 
purposes, Japanese firms do not show evidence of shifting income for tax purposes.  I leave 
further investigation of this for future research. 
5.4 Tests of Hypothesis 2 
 My second hypothesis states that the difference in the tax-motivated income shifting 
of territorial and worldwide firms is decreasing in the reinvestment opportunities in the 
foreign country.  This prediction is based on the assumption that worldwide firms have more 
incentive to shift income when the shifted income can be reinvested abroad (and thus avoid 
the home country tax liability) while territorial firms’ incentive is unrelated to what happens 
to the income after it is shifted.  To test this hypothesis, I calculate the asset growth of the 
subsidiary (where, as in previous tests, all entities within a country are aggregated into one 
“subsidiary) as a proxy for reinvestment opportunities.  Assets are defined as total assets less 
cash.  For the tabulated tests, I use the asset growth from the end of 2004 to the end of 2007.  
In untabulated results, I use growth in 2006, growth in 2005-2006, and growth in 2007 and 
inferences are unchanged.  
 Using the calculated asset growth, I sort observations within parent countries both in 
quintiles and above/below the median.  I then code three indicator variables: ܣܤܱܸܧ = 1 if 
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the asset growth is above the median; ܱܶܲܳ = 1 if the asset growth is in the top quintile; and 
ܤܱܱܶܶܯܳ = 1 if the asset growth is in the bottom quintile.  I then include each of the three 
in Equation 1 in turn to test H2.  Focusing first on the split at the median, if H2 is correct, 
four things should be true.  First, the coefficient on ܶܶ כ ܥ should be negative, indicating 
that, for firms with below-median reinvestment opportunities, territorial firms shift more than 
worldwide firms.  Second, the coefficient on ܥ כ ܣܤܱܸܧ should be negative, indicating that 
worldwide firms with more investment opportunities shift more.  Third, the sum of ܥ כ
ܣܤܱܸܧ and ܶܶ כ ܥ כ ܣܤܱܸܧ should be zero, indicating that reinvestment opportunities do 
not affect the income shifting for territorial firms.  Fourth, the sum of ܶܶ כ ܥ and ܶܶ כ ܥ כ
ܣܤܱܸܧ should be zero, indicating that, for firms with more reinvestment opportunities, there 
is no difference in the income shifting of worldwide and territorial firms.  Predictions are the 
same when ܱܶܲܳ is substituted for ܣܤܱܸܧ.  When ܤܱܱܶܶܯܳ is substituted for ܣܤܱܸܧ, 
the predicted sign on ܥ כ ܤܱܱܶܶܯܳ is positive and the predicted sign on the sum of ܶܶ כ ܥ 
and ܶܶ כ ܥ כ ܤܱܱܶܶܯܳ is negative. 
 Results are presented in Table 9.55  Consistent with predictions, while there is a 
significant different in the income shifting of territorial and worldwide firms with below-
median reinvestment opportunities (as evidenced by the estimate of -1.23 on ܶܶ כ ܥ), there is 
no difference in the income shifting of territorial and worldwide firms with above-median 
reinvestment opportunities: the F-statistic for the difference of the total slope coefficients 
presented below the table is not statistically significant.  As a lack of statistical significance is 
                                                            
55 Results are presented using the full sample.  When the test is repeated excluding Japanese parents (untabulated), 
inferences remain unchanged using the median test.  When the top quintile is split out, all inferences remain except that the 
coefficient on ܥ כ ܱܶܲܳ is not statistically significant.  When the bottom quintile is split out, the sum of ܶܶ כ ܥ and 
ܶܶ כ ܥ כ ܤܱܱܶܶܯܳ is not statistically significant. 
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not conclusive evidence of a lack of difference, the other two tests lend additional support to 
the conclusion.  When the top quintile is split out, all inferences remain the same as when the 
split is done at the median.  When the bottom quintile is split out, the F-statistic for the 
difference is strongly significant, providing more direct evidence that the difference in 
shifting behavior of the two groups is affected by the opportunity to leave the shifted income 
abroad. 
5.5 Tests of Hypotheses 3a, 3b and 3c 
 Hypothesis 3, taken as whole, is similar to H2 in that it is driven by the prediction that 
the cash constraints of a worldwide firm affect its incentive to shift income for tax purposes.  
The difference in this setting from that of H2 is that the prediction for the territorial firms is 
that they also are affected by cash constraints, but in the opposite direction.  In this case, an 
association between the difference in shifting of the two groups and the cash constraints of 
the parent could be driven by differences in either or both groups.  That is the reason the 
hypothesis is divided into three parts. 
 As a proxy for the domestic cash constraints of the parent, I calculate the domestic 
leverage ((Current liabilities + Non-current liabilities)/Shareholders’ equity) for each parent 
by aggregating all unconsolidated data in the home country.  I then rank firms within 
countries in quintiles and above and below the median based on this calculated ratio and code 
the same three indicator variables, ܣܤܱܸܧ, ܱܶܲܳ and ܤܱܱܶܶܯܳ.  For the split at the 
median, the following are the predictions for the coefficients that come out of the separate 
hypotheses.  H3a predicts that the coefficient on ܥ כ ܣܤܱܸܧ will be positive, indicating that 
worldwide firms needing cash at home sooner shift less.  H3b predicts that the sum of 
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ܥ כ ܣܤܱܸܧ and ܶܶ כ ܥ כ ܣܤܱܸܧ will be negative, indicating that territorial firms needing 
cash at home shift more income for tax purposes.  H3c predicts that the sum of ܶܶ כ ܥ and 
ܶܶ כ ܥ כ ܣܤܱܸܧ should be negative, indicating that, among firms needing cash at home, 
territorial firms shift more than worldwide firms. 
Results are presented in Table 10.56  The sample used for these tests is smaller 
because not all parent firms have the necessary data for calculating domestic leverage.57 The 
estimate of the coefficient on ܥ כ ܣܤܱܸܧ is positive (0.67), consistent with the prediction of 
H3a, but is not statistically significant.  As predicted in H3b, the sum of the estimates for 
ܥ כ ܣܤܱܸܧ and ܶܶ כ ܥ כ ܣܤܱܸܧ is negative and significant, as shown in the first F-test 
below the table.  Finally, the sum of ܶܶ כ ܥ and ܶܶ כ ܥ כ ܣܤܱܸܧ is negative and significant, 
indicating that the difference between the shifting of the groups predicted in H3c exists. 
Taken as a whole, the results of the tests of Hypotheses 2 and 3 support the 
conclusion that worldwide firms with the opportunity and ability to leave shifted earnings 
abroad indefinitely shift as much income as their territorial counterparts.  These tests show 
that the differences between the average firms in the two groups identified in the main tests 
are driven by differences in the subsamples of firms facing domestic cash constraints or 
weaker foreign reinvestment opportunities. 
                                                            
56 As in Table 9, results are presented using the full sample.  When the test is repeated excluding Japanese parents 
(untabulated), all inferences remain unchanged except that, in the top quintile split, the coefficient on ܥ כ ܱܶܲܳ is 
statistically significant.   
57 Unfortunately, I lose a larger proportion of worldwide observations than territorial observations.  In the main sample, 36% 
of observations are worldwide.  In this sample, 28% are worldwide. 
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5.6 Tests of Hypothesis 4 
 I conclude the empirical tests in the paper by examining a possible consequence of 
the taxation of foreign dividends, the trapping of cash abroad.  If, as shown, in the tests of 
H1, territorial firms shift more income to their low-tax subsidiaries, it is of interest to know if 
the differences in cash levels are consistent with the differences in shifting.  Hypothesis 4 
predicts that worldwide firms will have more cash in low-tax countries despite the fact that 
they shift less income to those countries.  To test H4, I estimate Equation 2.  To maximize 
available observations for this test, I form a new sample, keeping all observations with the 
required data for this model, regardless of whether they were in the previous sample or not.58  
Consistent with the income shifting tests, I aggregate all subsidiaries of the same GUO by 
country.59  I expect the coefficient on ܵܶܣܶܦܫܨܨ (the association between repatriation 
ܶܶ כ ܵܶܣܶܦܫܨܨ cost and cash level for worldwide firms) to be positive, and the sum of 
ܵܶܣܶܦܫܨܨ and (the association between repatriation cost and cash level for territorial firms) 
to be zero.   
Results are presented in Table 11.  Because ܦܱܯ_ܴܦ is missing for 42% of the 
observations, I estimate Equation 2 with it included (Model 1) and with it excluded (Model 
2). As results are unchanged by the inclusion of ܦܱܯ_ܴܦ, I focus my discussion on Model 
1.  The coefficient on ܵܶܣܶܦܫܨܨ is positive, indicating that as the difference between the tax 
rates of the subsidiary and the parent increases, the worldwide subsidiary holds more cash.   
The coefficient on ܶܶ כ ܵܶܣܶܦܫܨܨ is negative and significant and the sum of ܵܶܣܶܦܫܨܨ 
                                                            
58 Results are qualitatively the same when a subsample of the income shifting sample is used. 
59 I include Japanese parents in the sample.  Inferences are unchanged when they are excluded. 
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and ܶܶ כ ܵܶܣܶܦܫܨܨ is not statistically different from zero, as indicated in the F-test below 
the table.  These results indicate that the tax costs of repatriation lead to inefficient cash 
management for worldwide firms relative to territorial firms that do not face such costs.    
Combining the results in the main tests with those reported in Table 11, I infer that 
low-tax subsidiaries of worldwide parents are recipients of less shifted income but hold more 
cash than similar subsidiaries of territorial parents.  These results are consistent with those of 
Foley et al. (2007), Blouin et al. (2010), and Graham et al. (2010) and indicate that 
multinationals subject to worldwide tax regimes bear a dead-weight cost in the form of 
inefficient allocation of their resources.  While territorial subsidiaries are distributing cash 
back to their parents, worldwide subsidiaries are holding the cash, at least in part to avoid the 
tax cost that would be borne if it was distributed as a dividend. 
In an additional test, I further divide the territorial group into those that tax 5% of the 
dividend and those that fully exempt dividends to test whether the small tax cost affects 
repatriation decisions.60  The results of these tests are presented in Models 3 and 4 of Table 
11.  The results of three separate F-tests are presented below the main table.  The first test 
reveals that the incremental slope coefficients, ܶܶ_5 כ ܵܶܣܶܦܫܨܨ and ܶܶ_0 כ ܵܶܣܶܦܫܨܨ, 
are not statistically different and the lower two tests indicate that neither of the total slope 
coefficients are significantly different from zero.  I conclude from these tests that the 
imposition of tax on 5% of foreign dividends does not affect the repatriation decisions of 
territorial multinationals. 
                                                            
60 The countries which generally tax 5% of foreign dividends are Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, and Switzerland.  For 
this additional test, I code an indicator variable, ܶܶ_5 = 1 for these countries and a second indicator variable ܶܶ_0 = 1 for all 
other territorial countries. 
  
 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 The taxation of foreign commerce and the erosion of tax bases through international 
income shifting are subjects of ongoing and contentious debate in many countries as the 
increasing globalization of markets makes their consequences for national treasuries, firms 
and individuals more significant.  This paper contributes needed empirical data to those 
debates by directly comparing the income shifting behaviors of multinationals subject to 
different systems of taxation of their foreign earnings and finding systematic differences 
between them.   
 As is true of results of any study of income shifting, my results rely on the validity of 
the empirical model of expected income.  To the extent that actual earnings are determined 
by factors other than capital, labor and productivity inputs, the amount of shifted income is 
measured with error.  Another caveat is that the sample subsidiaries in this study are heavily 
concentrated in Europe; it is possible that the findings are unique to subsidiaries in that 
region and not generalizable. 
 I find that multinationals domiciled in every country except Japan engage in tax-
motivated income shifting and that those domiciled in territorial countries, on average, shift 
more income than those domiciled in worldwide countries.  In more detailed tests, I find that 
the income shifting of worldwide firms that are able to leave the shifted income invested 
abroad and that of similar territorial firms are not statistically different.  I also find that the 
low-tax subsidiaries of worldwide parents hold more cash than do those of territorial parents, 
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suggesting that the worldwide tax system negatively affects the efficiency of its 
multinationals.  Taken as a whole, my findings suggest that a change from a worldwide 
system to a territorial one will be accompanied by an increase in income shifting by the 
average firm, but not by firms that have consistently reinvested foreign earnings abroad. My 
results also suggest that such a change would remove the inefficiency of having cash trapped 
in lower-tax jurisdictions. 
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Appendix A – Calculation of the tax variable, ܥ௜ ൌ ଵሺଵିఛ೔ሻ
∑ ಳೖభషഓೖሺఛ೔ିఛೖሻ
೙ೖಯ೔
∑ ಳೖభషഓೖ
೙ೖసభ
 
The following scenarios illustrate the calculation of C, its variation with its inputs, and its variation from simple 
rate differences.  The three scenarios are identical except for the distribution of revenue across subsidiaries and 
assume that the parent is domiciled in the same country as Subsidiary 3 (i.e., has a 20% tax rate).  Rate 
difference is the subsidiary’s tax rate minus the parent’s tax rate. 
 
כ ܥଵ ൌ ଵሺଵି଴ሻ
భబబ
భషబ.భሺ଴ି଴.ଵሻା
ఱబ
భషబ.మሺ଴ି଴.ଶሻା
ఴబ
భషబ.యሺ଴ି଴.ଷሻభబ
భషబା
భబబ
భషబ.భା
ఱబ
భషబ.మା
ఴబ
భషబ.య
ൌ െ0.19  
  
 
Scenario 1
 Subsidiary   Tax rate   Revenue   C 
Rate 
difference 
1 0% 10            (0.19)     * (0.20)        
2 10% 100          (0.12)     (0.10)        
3 20% 50            0.01      ‐           
4 30% 80            0.15      0.10          
Mean 15% 60            (0.04)  (0.05)     
Scenario 2
 Subsidiary   Tax rate   Revenue   C 
Rate 
difference 
1 0% 10            (0.22)     (0.20)        
2 10% 50            (0.15)     (0.10)        
3 20% 80            (0.03)     ‐           
4 30% 100          0.11      0.10          
Mean 15% 60            (0.07)  (0.05)     
Scenario 3
 Subsidiary   Tax rate   Revenue   C 
Rate 
difference 
1 0% 80            (0.17)     (0.20)        
2 10% 10            (0.06)     (0.10)        
3 20% 100          0.04      ‐           
4 30% 50            0.19      0.10          
Mean 15% 60            0.00    (0.05)     
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Table 1 – Sample countries   
 
This table reports summary statistics for all countries included in the study. The first column reports the statutory tax rates (which include 
sub-national taxes for a representative firm in the country) used for each country.  Rates are current as of January 1, 2007.  The Parents 
column reports the number of unique parents domiciled in the given country that have subsidiaries in the sample.  The Sample subsidiaries 
column reports the number of sample observations having subsidiaries domiciled in the given country.  The Common-parent subsidiaries 
column reports the number of subsidiaries domiciled in the country that contribute to the calculation of C, the tax variable.  The sample 
subsidiaries are a subset of the common-parent subsidiaries.  
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Territorial Worldwide
Australia  30% 30          36           Argentina  35% 7           
Austria  25% 111        204        551         Brazil  32% 5            15         
Belgium  34% 231        871        1,196      Bulgaria  10% 102        136       
Bermuda 0% 18          20           Chile  17% 10         
Bolivia  25% 1             China  33% 3            309       
Canada  32% 23          30           Colombia  34% 1            2           
Cayman Islands 0% 8            10           Cyprus 10% 4            4           
Croatia  20% 3            137        180         Ecuador  25% 3            3           
Czech Republic  24% 579        725         Greece  29% 36          342       
Denmark  28% 278        484        969         India  43% 23          99         
Estonia  23% 20          227        366         Indonesia  30% 2           
Finland  26% 108        484        751         Ireland  13% 42          1            551       
France  34% 386        1,883     2,854      Jamaica  33% 1           
Germany  40% 579        1,434     2,167      Japan  43% 372        261        541       
Hong Kong  18% 3            4             Liechtenstein  20% 3            3           
Hungary  20% 5            200        293         Malta  35% 1           
Iceland  18% 10          4            21           Mexico  29% 4            4           
Italy  37% 372        1,193     1,677      New Zealand  33% 3            9           
Kuwait  55% 3            3             Peru  30% 17         
Latvia  15% 6            157         Poland  19% 28          842        1,253    
Lithuania  19% 3            137         Portugal  25% 37          505        737       
Luxembourg  30% 65          61          172         Romania  16% 193        252       
Malaysia  28% 2            4             Russia  24% 4            354       
Netherlands  26% 159        311        716         Saudi Arabia  20% 4            4           
Netherlands Antilles  3% 6            6             South Korea 28% 45          238        300       
Norway  28% 86          288        1,162      Taiwan  25% 13          20         
Panama  30% 2             Trinidad and Tobago  25% 1           
Singapore  20% 12          187         Ukraine  25% 48          83         
Slovak Republic  19% 3            215        309         United Kingdom  30% 470        2,040     3,364    
Slovenia  25% 4            14          17           United States  40% 802        1,224    
South Africa  37% 11          26          
Spain  33% 297        1,542     2,118     
Sweden  28% 622        1,167     1,702     
Switzerland  16% 204        9            233        
Turkey  20% 13          59          
United Arab Emirates  50% 3            3            
Uruguay  30% 1            
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Table 2 – Descriptive statistics 
Panel A – Full sample by subsample 
 
 
Panel A reports summary statistics for the two subsamples of the main sample.  All data are for the 2006 calendar year.  Log(Pretax income) 
is the natural logarithm of profit before income tax expense (in thousands of dollars).  C is the family-level tax incentive measure developed 
by Huizinga and Laeven (2008).  Log(Labor costs) is the natural logarithm of  the compensation expense (in thousands of dollars) of the 
subsidiary. Log(Tangible fixed assets) is the natural logarithm of the tangible fixed assets (in thousands of dollars) of the subsidiary.  
Log(Value added) is the natural logarithm of value added in 2006 in the subsidiary’s country (in millions of U.S. dollars).  NOCFC=1 if the 
country does not have controlled foreign corporation rules; 0 otherwise.  Stability and Rule of law are indexes running from -2.5 to 2.5 from 
the Worldwide Governance Indicators (Kaufmann, et al., 2008).  Stability is designed to capture “perceptions of the likelihood that the 
government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including domestic violence and terrorism.” Rule of 
law is designed to capture “the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of 
contract enforcement, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence.” 
* Indicates means are different at the 5% level. 
  
N Mean Median Max Min Stdev
Territorial
Number of parents 3,721        
Log(Pretax income) 9,962         7.20 7.18 16.08 0.00 2.36
C 9,962         ‐0.02 ‐0.01 0.34 ‐0.31 0.08
Log(Compensation) 9,962         8.20 8.14 16.06 0.00 2.05
Log(Tangible fixed assets) 9,962         7.09 7.17 17.53 0.00 2.95
Log(Value added) 9,962         10.39 10.48 18.03 2.26 1.46
NOCFC 9,962         0.26 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.44
Stability 9,962         0.69 0.61 1.59 ‐0.90 0.35
Rule of law 9,962         1.24 1.38 2.06 ‐1.02 0.61
Worldwide
Number of parents 1,890        
Log(Pretax income) 5,584         7.84 7.79 17.32 0.00 2.30 *
C 5,584         ‐0.03 ‐0.02 0.35 ‐0.35 0.09 *
Log(Compensation) 5,584         8.74 8.67 15.82 0.00 1.91 *
Log(Tangible fixed assets) 5,584         7.46 7.46 18.06 0.00 3.03 *
Log(Value added) 5,584         10.76 10.57 18.03 3.26 1.96 *
NOCFC 5,584         0.05 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.21 *
Stability 5,584         0.67 0.61 1.59 ‐0.90 0.30 *
Rule of law 5,584         1.29 1.38 2.06 ‐1.02 0.56 *
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Panel B – Sample by subsidiary country 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B reports means of variables grouped by subsidiary country.  Countries with fewer than 50 observations are not reported.  N is the 
number of observations in which the given country is the subsidiary country.  # parent countries reports the number of different parent 
countries having at least one subsidiary in the country.  %Territorial reports the percentage of subsidiaries in the given country that are 
controlled by parents in territorial countries. C is the family-level tax incentive measure developed by Huizinga and Laeven (2008).  
Log(Pretax income) is the natural logarithm of profit before income tax expense (in thousands of dollars).  Log(Labor costs) is the natural 
logarithm of  the compensation expense (in thousands of dollars) of the subsidiary. Log(Tangible fixed assets) is the natural logarithm of the 
tangible fixed assets (in thousands of dollars) of the subsidiary.  Log(Value Added) is the natural logarithm of value added in 2006 in the 
subsidiary’s country (in millions of U.S. dollars). NOCFC=1 if the country does not have controlled foreign corporation rules; 0 otherwise. 
Stability and Rule of law are indexes running from -2.5 to 2.5 from the Worldwide Governance Indicators (Kaufmann, et al., 2008).  
Stability is designed to capture “perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or 
violent means, including domestic violence and terrorism.” Rule of law is designed to capture “the extent to which agents have confidence 
in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood 
of crime and violence.”  
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Austria  204        24     0.71    (0.09)    7.94     9.16     8.02     8.89     0.27    1.03    1.85  
Belgium  871        28     0.67    0.02     7.61     8.75     7.26     9.03     0.35    0.79    1.39  
Bulgaria  102        21     0.70    (0.22)    6.76     6.63     6.96     10.36   0.38    0.38    (0.19) 
Croatia  137        22     0.75    (0.13)    6.73     7.21     6.79     10.67   0.31    0.41    (0.05) 
Czech Republic  579        37     0.66    (0.10)    6.94     7.67     7.10     11.49   0.26    0.87    0.75  
Denmark  484        25     0.71    (0.03)    7.52     8.67     6.99     10.61   0.11    0.86    1.95  
Estonia  227        19     0.87    (0.07)    5.82     6.33     5.54     9.71     0.07    0.76    0.94  
Finland  484        24     0.76    (0.05)    6.65     7.76     5.75     8.36     0.11    1.47    1.96  
France  1,883     42     0.65    0.02     7.35     8.77     7.03     10.58   0.20    0.51    1.38  
Germany  1,434     38     0.59    0.08     8.29     9.41     8.11     10.82   0.17    0.92    1.73  
Hungary  200        23     0.73    (0.14)    6.72     7.46     7.09     13.18   0.25    0.83    0.80  
Italy  1,193     36     0.68    0.06     7.34     8.44     7.16     10.29   0.18    0.42    0.34  
Japan  261        14     0.05    0.06     9.70     8.63     10.50   16.36   0.02    1.10    1.38  
Luxembourg  61          13     0.75    (0.04)    7.52     8.34     6.83     6.43     0.38    1.50    1.81  
Netherlands  311        25     0.53    (0.09)    8.51     8.85     7.75     9.53     0.22    0.80    1.72  
Norway  288        19     0.80    (0.03)    7.96     8.72     6.89     10.73   0.11    1.18    2.00  
Poland  842        34     0.72    (0.15)    6.66     7.03     6.72     11.28   0.22    0.33    0.28  
Portugal  505        27     0.69    (0.09)    6.42     7.40     6.49     8.17     0.14    0.91    0.94  
Romania  193        21     0.67    (0.17)    6.59     6.98     7.30     11.72   0.30    0.23    (0.20) 
Slovak Republic  215        24     0.73    (0.14)    6.33     6.96     6.90     10.63   0.30    0.69    0.41  
South Korea 238        19     0.34    (0.08)    8.48     8.52     8.48     14.98   0.12    0.41    0.74  
Spain  1,542     35     0.70    (0.01)    7.05     8.22     6.99     9.95     0.14    0.17    1.04  
Sweden  1,167     31     0.79    (0.03)    7.07     7.95     6.33     11.29   0.10    1.17    1.88  
United Kingdom  2,040     44     0.44    (0.04)    8.02     9.19     7.88     10.33   0.17    0.61    1.70  
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Panel C – Sample by parent country 
 
Panel C reports means of variables grouped by parent country.  N is the number of observations in which the given country is the parent country.  # parents 
reports the number of parents domiciled in the given country that have subsidiaries in the sample. C is the family-level tax incentive measure developed by 
Huizinga and Laeven (2008).  Log(Pretax income) is the natural logarithm of profit before income tax expense (in thousands of dollars).  Log(Labor costs) is 
the natural logarithm of  the compensation expense (in thousands of dollars) of the subsidiary. Log(Tangible fixed assets) is the natural logarithm of the tangible 
fixed assets (in thousands of dollars) of the subsidiary.  Log(Value Added) is the natural logarithm of value added in 2006 in the subsidiary’s country (in 
millions of U.S. dollars).  NOCFC=1 if the country does not have controlled foreign corporation rules; 0 otherwise.  Stability and Rule of law are indexes 
running from -2.5 to 2.5 from the Worldwide Governance Indicators (Kaufmann, et al., 2008).  Stability is designed to capture “perceptions of the likelihood 
that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including domestic violence and terrorism.” Rule of law is 
designed to capture “the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, the 
police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence.” 
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Australia  80          30       (0.00)  7.32   8.11   6.75   10.17  0 0.63  1.34 
Austria  300        111     (0.01)  6.92   7.82   7.50   10.59  1 0.68  0.97 
Belgium  573        231     (0.03)  6.95   8.04   7.10   9.95    1 0.67  1.24 
Bermuda 75          18       (0.01)  8.35   9.31   7.75   10.66  1 0.65  1.31 
Canada  42          23       (0.01)  7.35   8.39   6.44   10.32  0 0.60  1.41 
Denmark  653        278     (0.00)  6.63   7.60   6.20   10.64  0 0.84  1.50 
Estonia  21          20       0.03   7.19   7.22   6.91   9.54    0 0.83  1.10 
Finland  378        108     (0.01)  7.34   8.31   7.02   10.11  0 0.88  1.36 
France  1,359     386     (0.04)  7.84   8.90   7.68   10.39  0 0.61  1.16 
Germany  1,659     579     (0.05)  7.45   8.37   7.41   10.52  0 0.65  1.17 
Italy  803        372     (0.03)  6.88   7.76   7.04   10.29  0 0.51  0.90 
Luxembourg  139        65       (0.03)  7.76   8.50   7.59   10.17  1 0.65  1.17 
Netherlands  624        159     (0.01)  7.32   8.40   7.03   10.51  1 0.69  1.24 
Netherlands Antilles  22          6         0.01   6.99   8.67   7.02   10.10  1 0.61  1.20 
Norway  203        86       (0.00)  7.39   8.33   7.14   10.56  0 0.82  1.52 
Poland  43          28       0.01   6.83   7.26   7.81   11.01  1 0.50  0.58 
Portugal  67          37       0.02   6.88   7.93   7.71   9.00    0 0.58  1.02 
Singapore  21          12       0.08   6.19   7.92   5.76   10.20  1 0.53  1.34 
South Africa  30          11       (0.01)  7.69   8.78   7.64   10.23  0 0.70  1.47 
Spain  577        297     (0.02)  6.99   7.99   7.47   9.69    0 0.47  1.03 
Sweden  1,522     622     (0.01)  6.88   7.87   6.44   10.48  0 0.92  1.53 
Switzerland  714        204     (0.01)  7.08   8.35   7.02   10.63  1 0.65  1.19 
Worldwide
Greece  51          36       (0.06)  6.54   6.97   7.20   10.88  1 0.47  0.43 
India  53          23       (0.03)  7.45   9.01   8.19   10.25  1 0.69  1.41 
Ireland  85          42       0.03   7.59   8.73   8.29   10.08  1 0.64  1.36 
Japan  1,104     372     (0.07)  7.97   8.43   7.86   11.81  0 0.74  1.34 
South Korea 90          45       (0.01)  8.01   8.47   7.78   12.54  0 0.58  1.14 
Taiwan  29          13       0.01   6.83   7.83   5.77   10.74  1 0.65  1.26 
United Kingdom  1,148     470     (0.00)  8.07   9.03   7.75   10.50  0 0.65  1.34 
United States  2,909     802     (0.02)  7.77   8.81   7.16   10.48  0 0.67  1.29 
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Panel D – Sample distribution across subsidiary countries 
 
This table reports the distribution of observations across subsidiary countries.  N reports the number of observations in each subsidiary 
country.  The top row reports the number of observations by parent country.  Parent countries with fewer than 500 observations are not 
included.  Each cell reports the percentage of the parent country’s observations that are in each subsidiary country.  For example, in the full 
sample, 1% of observations are in Austria and 6% are in Belgium, while fewer than 0.5% of the subsidiaries of Belgian parents are in 
Austria and 31% of them are in Belgium.  - indicates that there are zero observations in the cell.  A “0” indicates that the percentage in that 
cell is less than 0.5, but greater than 0. 
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Subsidiary country 15,546   573            653    1,359  1,659  803    1,104  624    577    1,522  714    1,148  2,909    
AUSTRIA 204       1        0               1      1       3       0      1       1      0       1         1        1       1         
BELGIUM 871       6        31             3      8       3       2      3       11    1       3         4        4       7         
BULGARIA 102       1        1               0      1       1       0      0       0      0       0         1        0       0         
CROATIA 137       1        1               1      1       1       1      0       1      1       0         1        1       1         
CZECH REPUBLIC 579       4        3               3      3       6       2      3       4      2       2         5        4       4         
DENMARK 484       3        1               18    2       2       0      1       3      ‐    5         2        2       3         
ESTONIA 227       1        0               2      1       1       ‐   0       1      0       5         1        1       1         
FINLAND 484       3        1               5      1       1       1      1       3      ‐    11       2        2       3         
FRANCE 1,883     12      21             8      23     12     15    9       9      10     6         16      13     13       
GERMANY 1,434     9        5               6      6       19     6      13     9      3       4         11      9       10       
HUNGARY 200       1        1               2      2       2       1      1       3      0       1         1        1       1         
ITALY 1,193     8        4               4      8       5       34    5       8      7       3         11      5       8         
JAPAN 261       2        0               ‐   0       0       ‐   20     0      ‐    0         0        0       1         
NETHERLANDS 311       2        2               1      2       2       1      3       4      ‐    1         2        2       3         
NORWAY 288       2        1               4      1       1       0      0       2      ‐    5         1        2       1         
POLAND 842       5        6               6      5       10     4      3       6      3       6         6        4       5         
PORTUGAL 505       3        2               1      4       3       3      2       3      21     1         3        3       2         
ROMANIA 193       1        1               0      1       2       3      1       1      1       0         2        1       1         
SLOVAKIA 215       1        2               1      2       2       1      1       2      ‐    0         1        1       1         
SOUTH KOREA 238       2        1               1      1       1       0      4       1      ‐    0         2        1       2         
SPAIN 1,542     10      6               4      11     11     14    7       9      44     4         9        9       9         
SWEDEN 1,167     8        3               20    4       2       3      3       5      1       33       6        4       5         
UNITED KINGDOM 2,040     13      7               7      10     9       7      18     13    6       6         11      30     17       
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Table 3 – Correlations  
 
 
This table reports correlation coefficients, Pearson above the diagonal, Spearman below. LogPLBT is the natural logarithm of profit before 
income tax expense (in thousands of dollars).  ܮܱܩܣܵܵܧܶܵ is the natural logarithm of tangible fixed assets reported by the subsidiary in 
2006.  ܮܱܩܥܱܯܲ is the natural logarithm of labor compensation paid by the subsidiary in 2006.  ܮܱܩܸܣ is the natural logarithm of value 
added in 2006 in the subsidiary’s country (in millions of U.S. dollars). ܶܶ is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the subsidiary is owned by a 
territorial parent; 0 otherwise.   ܥ is the family-level tax incentive measure developed by Huizinga and Laeven (2008).  NOCFC=1 if the 
country does not have controlled foreign corporation rules; 0 otherwise.  STABILITY and LAW are indexes running from -2.5 to 2.5 from the 
Worldwide Governance Indicators (Kaufmann, et al., 2008).  STABILITY is designed to capture “perceptions of the likelihood that the 
government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including domestic violence and terrorism.” LAW is 
designed to capture “the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract 
enforcement, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence.” 
* indicates statistically significant at the 5% level.  
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LOGPLBT 0.74* 0.78* 0.01 ‐0.13* 0.11* ‐0.06* 0.05* 0.13*
LOGASSETS 0.74* 0.77* ‐0.04* ‐0.06* 0.08* ‐0.01 ‐0.02 0.03*
LOGCOMP 0.79* 0.77* ‐0.10* ‐0.13* 0.22* ‐0.04* 0.03* 0.23*
LOGVA ‐0.06* ‐0.14* ‐0.14* ‐0.11* ‐0.00 ‐0.03 ‐0.04 ‐0.12*
TT ‐0.13* ‐0.05* ‐0.13* ‐0.06* 0.03* 0.26* 0.02 ‐0.05*
C 0.12* 0.09* 0.22* ‐0.01 0.04* 0.06* 0.04* 0.28*
NOCFC ‐0.06* ‐0.00 ‐0.03* ‐0.01 0.26* 0.06* ‐0.04* ‐0.07*
STABILITY 0.07* 0.01 0.07* 0.01 0.01 0.02* ‐0.04* 0.63*
LAW 0.13* 0.02* 0.21* ‐0.08* ‐0.02* 0.19* ‐0.06* 0.75*
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Table 4 – Main results 
 
     
ሺ1ሻ ܮ݋݃ܲܮܤ ௜ܶ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܶ ௜ܶ ൅ ߚଶܥ௜ ൅ ߚଷܶ ௜ܶ כ ܥ௜ ൅ ߚସܮ݋݃ܣܵܵܧܶ ௜ܵ ൅ ߚହܮ݋݃ܥܱܯ ௜ܲ ൅  ߚ଺ܮ݋ܸ݃ܣ௜ ൅ ߚ଻ܵܶܣܤܫܮܫܶ ௜ܻ ൅ ߚ଼ܮܣ ௜ܹ
൅ ߝ௜  
This table reports OLS estimates of (1). LogPLBT is the natural logarithm of profit before income tax expense (in thousands of dollars).  ܶܶ 
is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the subsidiary is owned by a territorial parent; 0 otherwise.   ܥ is the family-level tax incentive measure 
developed by Huizinga and Laeven (2008). ܮܱܩܣܵܵܧܶܵ is the natural logarithm of tangible fixed assets reported by the subsidiary in 2006.  
ܮܱܩܥܱܯܲ is the natural logarithm of labor compensation paid by the subsidiary in 2006.  ܮܱܩܸܣ is the natural logarithm of value added 
in 2006 in the subsidiary’s country (in millions of U.S. dollars). STABILITY and LAW are indexes running from -2.5 to 2.5 from the 
Worldwide Governance Indicators (Kaufmann, et al., 2008).  STABILITY is designed to capture “perceptions of the likelihood that the 
government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including domestic violence and terrorism.” LAW is 
designed to capture “the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract 
enforcement, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence.” Model (1) pools all types of subsidiaries by 
excluding the indicator variables and interaction terms from the model.   
Standard errors corrected for clustering at the parent level are reported in parentheses below the estimate.   
* and ** indicate statistical significance at the 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
 
  
Prediction (1) (2) (3)
INTERCEPT ‐0.96** ‐0.79** ‐0.91**
(0.07) (0.08) (0.08)
TT ‐0.12** ‐0.13**
(0.02) (0.02)
C ‐ ‐1.12** ‐0.50** ‐0.47**
(0.10) (0.16) (0.16)
TT*C ‐ ‐0.97** ‐0.88**
(0.19) (0.19)
LOGASSETS + 0.23** 0.23** 0.23**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
LOGCOMP + 0.68** 0.67** 0.68**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
LOGVA + 0.10** 0.09** 0.09**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
STABILITY + 0.31**
(0.03)
LAW + ‐0.08**
(0.02)
Fixed effects Industry Industry Industry
N 15,006 15,010 15,008
Adj  Rsquare 0.79 0.79 0.79
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Table 5 – Within-country test around a change in system 
 
 
ሺ1ܽሻ ܮ݋݃ܲܮܤ ௜ܶ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܱܲܵܶ03௜ ൅ ߚଶܥ௜ ൅ ߚଷܱܲܵܶ03௜ כ ܥ௜ ൅ ߚସܮ݋݃ܣܵܵܧܶ ௜ܵ ൅ ߚହܮ݋݃ܥܱܯ ௜ܲ ൅ ߚ଺ܮ݋ܸ݃ܣ௜ ൅ ߚ଻ܵܶܣܤܫܮܫܶ ௜ܻ
൅ ߚ଼ܮܣ ௜ܹ ൅ ߝ௜  
This table reports OLS estimates of (1a) using subsamples indicated in the column headings. LogPLBT is the natural logarithm of profit 
before income tax expense (in thousands of dollars).  ܱܲܵܶ03 is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the observation is from after 2003; 0 
otherwise (for Norway, this is equivalent to TT in the original Equation 1, for Sweden, it is simply a time indicator).   ܥ is the family-level 
tax incentive measure developed by Huizinga and Laeven (2008). ܮܱܩܣܵܵܧܶܵ is the natural logarithm of tangible fixed assets reported by 
the subsidiary in 2006.  ܮܱܩܥܱܯܲ is the natural logarithm of labor compensation paid by the subsidiary in 2006.  ܮܱܩܸܣ is the natural 
logarithm of value added in 2006 in the subsidiary’s country (in millions of U.S. dollars). STABILITY and LAW are indexes running from -
2.5 to 2.5 from the Worldwide Governance Indicators (Kaufmann, et al., 2008).  STABILITY is designed to capture “perceptions of the 
likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including domestic violence and 
terrorism.” LAW is designed to capture “the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the 
quality of contract enforcement, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence.”  
Standard errors corrected for clustering at the parent level are not reported.   
* and ** indicate statistical significance at the 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
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INTERCEPT ‐0.40 ‐0.68 ‐0.46 ‐0.33 0.31 0.27 0.28 0.25
POST03 0.17* 0.18 0.19 0.09** 0.08** 0.09*
C ‐3.59** ‐3.01* ‐2.03 ‐2.07 ‐1.88** ‐1.90** ‐1.91** ‐1.97**
POST03*C ‐1.19 ‐2.20 ‐2.77 0.33 0.45 0.10
LOGASSETS 0.30** 0.30** 0.33** 0.32** 0.21** 0.21** 0.21** 0.19**
LOGCOMP 0.46** 0.45** 0.42** 0.43** 0.72** 0.71** 0.71** 0.73**
LOGVA 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04
STABILITY ‐0.14 0.03 ‐0.03 0.12 0.11 0.17 0.22* 0.16
LAW 0.13 0.04 0.12 0.01 ‐0.08 ‐0.12 ‐0.16 ‐0.09
Fixed effects Industry Industry Industry Industry Industry Industry Industry Industry
N 676 676 549 418 5,200 5,199 4,243 3,232
Adj Rsquare 0.79 0.79 0.78 0.79 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.82
Norway Sweden
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Table 6 – Robustness check, CFC rules 
 
 
ሺ1ܾሻ ܮ݋݃ܲܮܤ ௜ܶ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܶ ௜ܶ ൅ ߚଶܱܰܥܨܥ௜ ൅ ߚଷܶ ௜ܶ כ ܱܰܥܨܥ௜ ൅ ൅ߚସܥ௜ ൅ ߚଷܶ ௜ܶ כ ܥ௜ ൅ ߚହܱܰܥܨܥ௜ כ ܥ௜ ൅ ߚ଺ܶ ௜ܶ כ ܱܰܥܨܥ௜ כ ܥ௜
൅ ߚ଻ܮ݋݃ܣܵܵܧܶ ௜ܵ ൅ ߚ଼ܮ݋݃ܥܱܯ ௜ܲ ൅  ߚଽܮ݋ܸ݃ܣ௜ ൅ ߚଵ଴ܵܶܣܤܫܮܫܶ ௜ܻ ൅ ߚଵଵܮܣ ௜ܹ ൅ ߝ௜  
This table reports OLS estimates of versions of (1b). LogPLBT is the natural logarithm of profit before income tax expense (in thousands of 
dollars).  ܶܶ is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the subsidiary is owned by a territorial parent; 0 otherwise.   ܥ is the family-level tax 
incentive measure developed by Huizinga and Laeven (2008). NOCFC=1 if the country does not have controlled foreign corporation rules; 
0 otherwise.   ܮܱܩܣܵܵܧܶܵ is the natural logarithm of tangible fixed assets reported by the subsidiary in 2006.  ܮܱܩܥܱܯܲ is the natural 
logarithm of labor compensation paid by the subsidiary in 2006.  ܮܱܩܸܣ is the natural logarithm of value added in 2006 in the subsidiary’s 
country (in millions of U.S. dollars). STABILITY and LAW are indexes running from -2.5 to 2.5 from the Worldwide Governance Indicators 
(Kaufmann, et al., 2008).  STABILITY is designed to capture “perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or 
overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including domestic violence and terrorism.” LAW is designed to capture “the extent to 
which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, the police, and the 
courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence.” Model (1) pools all types of subsidiaries by excluding the indicator variables and 
interaction terms from the model.   
Standard errors corrected for clustering at the parent level are not reported.   
* and ** indicate statistical significance at the 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
  
Prediction (1) (2) (3)
INTERCEPT ‐0.91** ‐0.99** ‐0.90**
TT ‐0.13** ‐0.09**
NOCFC ‐0.19**
TT*NOCFC ‐0.15**
C ‐ ‐0.47** ‐0.71** ‐0.46**
TT*C ‐ ‐0.88** ‐0.60**
NOCFC*C ‐ ‐1.19**
TT*NOCFC*C ‐ ‐0.72**
LOGASSETS 0.23** 0.23** 0.23**
LOGCOMP 0.68** 0.68** 0.68**
LOGVA 0.09** 0.10** 0.09**
STABILITY 0.31** 0.30** 0.31**
LAW ‐0.08** ‐0.09** ‐0.09**
Fixed effects Industry Industry Industry
N 15,008 15,011 15,010
Adj  Rsquare 0.79 0.79 0.79
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Table 7 – Regressions by parent country 
 
ሺ1݀ሻ ܮ݋݃ܲܮܤ ௜ܶ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܥ௜ ൅ ߚଶܮ݋݃ܣܵܵܧܶ ௜ܵ ൅ ߚଷܮ݋݃ܥܱܯ ௜ܲ ൅ ߚସܮ݋ܸ݃ܣ௜ ൅ ߚହܵܶܣܤܫܮܫܶ ௜ܻ ൅ ߚ଺ܮܣ ௜ܹ ൅ ߝ௜  
This table reports OLS estimates of (1d) on subsamples of the parent county in the respective column. LogPLBT is the natural logarithm of 
profit before income tax expense (in thousands of dollars).  ܶܶ is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the subsidiary is owned by a territorial 
parent; 0 otherwise.   ܥ is the family-level tax incentive measure developed by Huizinga and Laeven (2008). ܮܱܩܣܵܵܧܶܵ is the natural 
logarithm of tangible fixed assets reported by the subsidiary in 2006.  ܮܱܩܥܱܯܲ is the natural logarithm of labor compensation paid by the 
subsidiary in 2006.  ܮܱܩܸܣ is the natural logarithm of value added in 2006 in the subsidiary’s country (in millions of U.S. dollars). 
STABILITY and LAW are indexes running from -2.5 to 2.5 from the Worldwide Governance Indicators (Kaufmann, et al., 2008).  
STABILITY is designed to capture “perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional 
or violent means, including domestic violence and terrorism.” LAW is designed to capture “the extent to which agents have confidence in 
and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of 
crime and violence.” STABILITY and LAW are indexes running from -2.5 to 2.5 from the Worldwide Governance Indicators (Kaufmann, et 
al., 2008).  STABILITY is designed to capture “perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by 
unconstitutional or violent means, including domestic violence and terrorism.” LAW is designed to capture “the extent to which agents have 
confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, the police, and the courts, as well as 
the likelihood of crime and violence.”  
(W) after the country name indicates the country has a worldwide tax system.  (T) indicates that the country has a territorial tax system. 
Standard errors corrected for clustering at the parent level are reported in parentheses below the estimate.   
* and ** indicate statistical significance at the 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
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INTERCEPT ‐1.09** ‐0.95** ‐0.75** ‐0.36 ‐0.46 ‐0.17 ‐1.07** ‐0.40 ‐0.81** ‐0.43*
(0.07) (0.27) (0.22) (0.49) (0.34) (0.44) (0.23) (0.35) (0.31) (0.19)
C ‐1.03** ‐1.34** ‐0.68* ‐1.70** 0.79* ‐1.87** ‐1.35** ‐2.04** ‐0.68 ‐0.53*
(0.10) (0.39) (0.30) (0.59) (0.39) (0.49) (0.44) (0.37) (0.40) (0.21)
LOGASSETS 0.23** 0.22** 0.25** 0.21** 0.32** 0.17** 0.19** 0.21** 0.24** 0.20**
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
LOGCOMP 0.68** 0.69** 0.64** 0.71** 0.48** 0.65** 0.73** 0.68** 0.69** 0.71**
(0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02)
LOGVA 0.10** 0.10** 0.09** 0.03 0.14** 0.07* 0.07** 0.03 0.06** 0.05**
(0.00) (0.02) (0.01) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
STABILITY 0.31** ‐0.14 0.30** 0.44* 0.22 ‐0.11 0.33** 0.25 0.38** 0.33**
(0.03) (0.12) (0.10) (0.18) (0.14) (0.15) (0.12) (0.14) (0.13) (0.07)
LAW ‐0.09** 0.10 ‐0.15* ‐0.12 0.10 0.17 0.02 ‐0.14 ‐0.15 ‐0.12**
(0.02) (0.07) (0.06) (0.08) (0.07) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.07) (0.04)
Fixed effects Industry Industry Industry Industry Industry Industry Industry Industry Industry Industry
N 15,010 1,337 1,643 763 1,088 617 1,316 711 1,093 2,879
Adj  Rsquare 0.79 0.80 0.80 0.76 0.77 0.76 0.80 0.78 0.83 0.79
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Table 8 – The effect of transfer pricing rules and culture 
 
ሺ1݁ሻ ܮ݋݃ܲܮܤ ௜ܶ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܶ ௜ܶ ൅ ߚଶܥ௜ ൅ ߚଷܶ ௜ܶ כ ܥ௜ ൅ ߚସܥܱܮܸܣܴ௜ ൅ ߚହܥܱܮܸܣܴ௜ כ ܥ௜ ൅ ߚ଺ܮ݋݃ܣܵܵܧܶ ௜ܵ ൅ ߚ଻ܮ݋݃ܥܱܯ ௜ܲ
൅  ߚ଼ܮ݋ܸ݃ܣ௜ ൅ ߚଽܵܶܣܤܫܮܫܶ ௜ܻ ൅ ߚଵ଴ܮܣ ௜ܹ ൅ ߝ௜  
This table reports OLS estimates of (1e). LogPLBT is the natural logarithm of profit before income tax expense (in thousands of dollars).  
ܶܶ is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the subsidiary is owned by a territorial parent; 0 otherwise.   ܥ is the family-level tax incentive 
measure developed by Huizinga and Laeven (2008). ܮܱܩܣܵܵܧܶܵ is the natural logarithm of tangible fixed assets reported by the subsidiary 
in 2006.  ܮܱܩܥܱܯܲ is the natural logarithm of labor compensation paid by the subsidiary in 2006.  ܮܱܩܸܣ is the natural logarithm of 
value added in 2006 in the subsidiary’s country (in millions of U.S. dollars). STABILITY and LAW are indexes running from -2.5 to 2.5 from 
the Worldwide Governance Indicators (Kaufmann, et al., 2008).  STABILITY is designed to capture “perceptions of the likelihood that the 
government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including domestic violence and terrorism.” LAW is 
designed to capture “the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract 
enforcement, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence.”  COLVAR is UNSTRICT in the middle pair of 
columns and CORRUPT in the last pair of columns.  UNSTRICT=1 if the parent country is judged to have unstrict transfer pricing practices 
by Mescall (2010); 0 otherwise.  CORRUPT is the negative of the value calculated for the parent country by Kaufmann et al (2008) which 
measures “perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, 
as well as “capture” of the state by elites and private interests.”   
Standard errors corrected for clustering at the parent level are not reported.   
* and ** indicate statistical significance at the 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
  
All
Exclude
JP All
Exclude
JP All
Exclude
JP
INTERCEPT ‐0.91** ‐0.66** ‐0.94** ‐0.70** ‐0.98** ‐0.73**
TT ‐0.13** ‐0.09** ‐0.14** ‐0.09** ‐0.16** ‐0.12**
C ‐0.47** ‐0.95** ‐0.45** ‐0.80** ‐0.51 ‐1.04**
TT*C ‐0.88** ‐0.51* ‐1.05** ‐0.64** ‐0.90** ‐0.53*
COLVAR 0.04 ‐0.01 ‐0.07** ‐0.08**
COLVAR*C 0.37 ‐0.13 ‐0.03 ‐0.05
LOGASSETS 0.23** 0.21** 0.23** 0.21** 0.23** 0.21**
LOGCOMP 0.68** 0.70** 0.68** 0.70** 0.68** 0.70**
LOGVA 0.09** 0.06** 0.10** 0.07** 0.09** 0.06**
STABILITY 0.31** 0.24** 0.31** 0.25** 0.29** 0.22**
LAW ‐0.08** ‐0.08** ‐0.09** ‐0.09** ‐0.09** ‐0.09**
Fixed effects Industry Industry Industry Industry Industry Industry
N 15,008 13,919 14,436 13,344 15,007 13,914
Adj  Rsquare 0.79 0.79 0.79 0.79 0.79 0.79
UNSTRICT CORRUPT
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Table 9 – The effect of foreign reinvestment opportunities 
 
ሺ1݂ሻ ܮ݋݃ܲܮܤ ௜ܶ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܶ ௜ܶ ൅ ߚଶܥ௜ ൅ ߚଷܶ ௜ܶ כ ܥ௜ ൅ ߚସܵܲܮܫܸܶܣܴ௜ ൅ ߚହܥ௜ כ ܵܲܮܫܸܶܣܴ௜ ൅ ߚ଺ܶ ௜ܶ כ ܥ௜ כ ܵܲܮܫܸܶܣܴ௜௜
൅ ߚ଻ܮ݋݃ܣܵܵܧܶ ௜ܵ ൅ ߚ଼ܮ݋݃ܥܱܯ ௜ܲ ൅  ߚଽܮ݋ܸ݃ܣ௜ ൅ ߚଵ଴ܵܶܣܤܫܮܫܶ ௜ܻ ൅ ߚଵଵܮܣ ௜ܹ ൅ ߝ௜  
This table reports OLS estimates of (1f). LogPLBT is the natural logarithm of profit before income tax expense (in thousands of dollars).  
ܶܶ is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the subsidiary is owned by a territorial parent; 0 otherwise.   ܥ is the family-level tax incentive 
measure developed by Huizinga and Laeven (2008). ܮܱܩܣܵܵܧܶܵ is the natural logarithm of tangible fixed assets reported by the subsidiary 
in 2006.  ܮܱܩܥܱܯܲ is the natural logarithm of labor compensation paid by the subsidiary in 2006.  ܮܱܩܸܣ is the natural logarithm of 
value added in 2006 in the subsidiary’s country (in millions of U.S. dollars). STABILITY and LAW are indexes running from -2.5 to 2.5 from 
the Worldwide Governance Indicators (Kaufmann, et al., 2008).  STABILITY is designed to capture “perceptions of the likelihood that the 
government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including domestic violence and terrorism.” LAW is 
designed to capture “the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract 
enforcement, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence.”  SPLITVAR assumes the value of the indicator 
variable which splits the sample at the point in the column heading, where observations have been sorted based on reinvestment 
opportunities. 
Standard errors corrected for clustering at the parent level are not reported.   
* and ** indicate statistical significance at the 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
p-values for F-tests are in parentheses below the F-statistic.  
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INTERCEPT ‐0.95** ‐0.97** ‐0.96** ‐0.87**
TT ‐0.13** ‐0.15** ‐0.14** ‐0.09**
C ‐ ‐0.48** ‐0.04 ‐0.19 ‐0.63**
TT*C ‐ ‐0.85** ‐1.23** ‐1.02** ‐0.64*
SPLITVAR 0.21** 0.20** ‐0.11**
TT*SPLITVAR 0 0.05 0.06 ‐0.09**
C*SPLITVAR ‐ ‐0.82** ‐0.67* 0.44
TT*C*SPLITVAR + 0.97** 0.69 ‐0.47
LOGASSETS 0.23** 0.23** 0.23** 0.23**
LOGCOMP 0.68** 0.67** 0.67** 0.67**
LOGVA 0.10** 0.09** 0.09** 0.10**
STABILITY 0.30** 0.30** 0.30** 0.29**
LAW ‐0.08** ‐0.07** ‐0.07** ‐0.08**
Fixed effects Industry Industry Industry Industry
N 14,610 14,609 14,613 14,611
Adj Rsquare 0.79 0.79 0.79 0.79
F‐tests
C*SPLITVAR + TT*C*SPLITVAR <> 0 0.52 0.07 0.07
(0.47) (0.79) (0.79)
TT*C + TT*C*SPLITVAR <> 0 0.40 0.56 10.56**
(0.53) (0.45) (0.00)
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Table 10 – The effect of domestic cash constraints 
 
ሺ1݂ሻ ܮ݋݃ܲܮܤ ௜ܶ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܶ ௜ܶ ൅ ߚଶܥ௜ ൅ ߚଷܶ ௜ܶ כ ܥ௜ ൅ ߚସܵܲܮܫܸܶܣܴ௜ ൅ ߚହܥ௜ כ ܵܲܮܫܸܶܣܴ௜ ൅ ߚ଺ܶ ௜ܶ כ ܥ௜ כ ܵܲܮܫܸܶܣܴ௜௜
൅ ߚ଻ܮ݋݃ܣܵܵܧܶ ௜ܵ ൅ ߚ଼ܮ݋݃ܥܱܯ ௜ܲ ൅  ߚଽܮ݋ܸ݃ܣ௜ ൅ ߚଵ଴ܵܶܣܤܫܮܫܶ ௜ܻ ൅ ߚଵଵܮܣ ௜ܹ ൅ ߝ௜  
This table reports OLS estimates of (1f). LogPLBT is the natural logarithm of profit before income tax expense (in thousands of dollars).  
ܶܶ is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the subsidiary is owned by a territorial parent; 0 otherwise.   ܥ is the family-level tax incentive 
measure developed by Huizinga and Laeven (2008). ܮܱܩܣܵܵܧܶܵ is the natural logarithm of tangible fixed assets reported by the subsidiary 
in 2006.  ܮܱܩܥܱܯܲ is the natural logarithm of labor compensation paid by the subsidiary in 2006.  ܮܱܩܸܣ is the natural logarithm of 
value added in 2006 in the subsidiary’s country (in millions of U.S. dollars). STABILITY and LAW are indexes running from -2.5 to 2.5 from 
the Worldwide Governance Indicators (Kaufmann, et al., 2008).  STABILITY is designed to capture “perceptions of the likelihood that the 
government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including domestic violence and terrorism.” LAW is 
designed to capture “the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract 
enforcement, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence.”  SPLITVAR assumes the value of the indicator 
variable which splits the sample at the point in the column heading, where observations have been sorted based on the domestic leverage of 
the parent. 
Standard errors corrected for clustering at the parent level are not reported.   
* and ** indicate statistical significance at the 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
p-values for F-tests are in parentheses below the F-statistic.  
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INTERCEPT ‐1.00** ‐1.03** ‐1.03** ‐1.03**
TT ‐0.15** ‐0.05 ‐0.10** ‐0.19**
C ‐ 0.01 ‐0.36 ‐0.14 0.06
TT*C ‐ ‐1.29** ‐0.54 ‐1.03** ‐1.50**
SPLITVAR 0.00 0.07 ‐0.02
TT*SPLITVAR ‐ ‐0.20** ‐0.26** 0.22**
C*SPLITVAR + 0.67 0.69 ‐0.35
TT*C*SPLITVAR ‐ ‐1.49** ‐1.38* 1.12
LOGASSETS 0.25** 0.25** 0.25** 0.25**
LOGCOMP 0.66** 0.66** 0.66** 0.66**
LOGVA 0.11** 0.11** 0.11** 0.11**
STABILITY 0.31** 0.31** 0.31** 0.32**
LAW ‐0.07** ‐0.07** ‐0.07** ‐0.07**
Fixed effects Industry Industry Industry Industry
N 10,186 10,190 10,188 10,187
Adj Rsquare 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80
F‐tests
C*SPLITVAR + TT*C*SPLITVAR <> 0 8.63 4.49 4.52
(0.00) (0.03) (0.03)
TT*C + TT*C*SPLITVAR <> 0 31.44 19.36 0.37
<.0001 <.0001 (0.54)
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Table 11 – Foreign cash holdings 
 
ܮ݋݃ܥܣܵܪ௜ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܶ ௜ܶ ൅ ߚଶܵܶܣܶܦܫܨܨ௜ ൅ ߚଷܶ ௜ܶ כ ܵܶܣܶܦܫܨܨ௜                        ൅ߚସܮ݋݃ܰܫ௜ ൅ ߚହܮ݋݃ܣܵܵܧܶ ௜ܵ ൅ ߚ଺ܵݐ݀݁ݒܰܫ௜ ൅ ߚ଻ܥܣܲܧ ௜ܺ  ൅ ߚ଻ܮܧ ௜ܸ ൅ ߚ଼ܴܦ௜ ൅ ߚଽܦܱܯ_ܴܦ௜൅ ߝ௜                    ሺ2ሻ 
 
This table reports OLS estimates of (2). ܮ݋݃ܥܣܵܪ the natural logarithm of (cash/total assets) reported on the unconsolidated financial 
statements of the subsidiary. ܵܶܣܶܦܫܨܨ is the larger of the statutory tax rate of the parent minus the statutory tax rate of subsidiary and 
zero.  ܶܶ is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the parent is domiciled in a territorial country; 0 otherwise. ܶܶ_5 is an indicator variable equal 
to 1 if the parent is domiciled in a territorial country that taxes 5% of foreign dividends; 0 otherwise. ܶܶ_0 is an indicator variable equal to 1 
if the parent is domiciled in a territorial country that fully exempts foreign dividends; 0 otherwise.  ܮ݋݃ܰܫ is the natural logarithm of (net 
income/total assets) reported on the unconsolidated financial statements of the subsidiary.  ܮ݋݃ܣܵܵܧܶܵ is the natural logarithm of total 
assets. ܵݐ݀݁ݒܰܫ is the standard deviation of (net income/total assets) reported on the unconsolidated financial statements of the subsidiary 
in years 2001 – 2006.  ܥܣܲܧܺ is (capital expenditures/total assets) reported on the unconsolidated financial statements of the subsidiary.  
ܮܧܸ is ((current liabilities + long-term debt)/total assets) reported on the unconsolidated financial statements of the subsidiary. ܴܦ is 
(intangible fixed assets/total assets) reported on the unconsolidated financial statements of subsidiary i. ܦܱܯ_ܴܦ is (intangible fixed 
assets/total assets) reported by the ultimate owner of subsidiary i in its home country.   
 
Standard errors corrected for clustering at the parent level are not reported.   
* and ** indicate statistical significance at the 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
p-values for F-tests are in parentheses below the F-statistic. 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
INTERCEPT ‐0.33** ‐0.15 ‐0.33** ‐0.14
TT ‐0.16** ‐0.24**
TT_5 ‐0.13** ‐0.19**
TT_0 ‐0.17** ‐0.28**
STATDIFF 1.38** 1.52** 1.38** 1.52**
TT*STATDIFF ‐1.61** ‐1.50**
TT_5*STATDIFF ‐1.73** ‐1.81**
TT_0*STATDIFF ‐1.71** ‐1.54*
NI 0.62** 1.01** 0.62** 1.02**
LOGASSETS ‐0.21** ‐0.21** ‐0.21** ‐0.22**
STDEVNI 0.37** 0.68** 0.37** 0.69**
CAPEX ‐1.82** ‐2.32** ‐1.81** ‐2.31**
LEV ‐0.02 ‐0.16** ‐0.02 ‐0.16**
RD ‐0.49** ‐0.28* ‐0.49** ‐0.29*
DOM_RD 0.07 0.08
Industry fixed effects Y Y Y Y
N 15,603 9,021 15,600 9,021
Adj Rsquare 0.17 0.19 0.17 0.19
F‐test 0.83 0
TT*STATDIFF + STATDIFF <> 0 (0.36) (0.95)
F‐test 0 0.16
TT_5*STATDIFF <> TT_0*STATDIFF (0.95) (0.69)
F‐test 1.35 0.65
TT_5*STATDIFF + STATDIFF <> 0 (0.25) (0.42)
F‐test 0.47 0
TT_0*STATDIFF + STATDIFF <> 0 (0.49) (0.97)
